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PBEFACE
One of the major tasks of the military establishment
is research and development. It is directly related to pre-
paring for any possible contingency in future warfare. The
usual approach to planning and procuring equipment is, or
rather stems from, an analysis of the previous conflict.
This, along with an appraisal of specific technological
advances both during and following the last war, forms the
concrete material from which plans, preparations, tactics, and
weapons are developed for a future conflict. Differences
naturally arise with different interpretations of what are
regarded as lessons of the past war. Each service will base
its analysis of the past and its projection of the future on
the specific missions traditionally assigned to it. Qy this
very fact, a difference in analysis and emphasis will exist.
One service may view something as particularly significant and
vital while the others may relegate it to a secondary order of
importance. This is an inter-service "conflict", and in
peacetime, with limited funds, it is important to convince the
fiscal authorities that a certain project is important for the
execution of that service's mission.
There is however another factor involved in gaining
the acceptance for a new weapon or concept. This is an
ii
lntra-service factor involving what often is a clash of view-
points and personalities as to the course to follow within the
service. At times these disputes, depending on the personali-
ties of the men involved, can become very bitter. This ia
especially true when there seems to be an uncalled for and
short-sighted intransigence at the top. The positions of
leadership in a service are usually occupied by men who were
the leaders in the previous war. These men "made their
fortunes" with the weapons and concepts of that past war.
Since these proved successful they are often indifferent and
at times even hostile to a new innovation with which they are
not intimately familiar. Far too often their realm of specu-
lation is limited to the "ifs" and "buts" of the last war. It
therefore is necessary for innovators and innovations to over-
come the inertia within a service and gain the support of the
hierarchy before they can venture into competition among the
services for financial support of an item needed for the mili-
tary preparedness and safety of the country.
To obtain the general acceptance for a new concept that
has met with opposition, and even if it has not, ceaseless and
dedicated work on the part of a few farsighted individuals is
often needed. These generally have to be persons within the
military establishment who have enough influence, are of a
high enough rank, and have enough time in the service so as
to be fully acquainted with the inner machinations of the ser-
vice. There has to be a thorough knowledge and competency on
lii
the part of the innovator in the field that improvement is
being sought in, and also the will to carry on the fight
against great odds. Admittedly, few persons possess these
qualities and even fewer are also good enough administrators
and public relations men to be able to carry their fight out-
side their service to achieve the general acceptance of their
program.
The purpose of this thesis is to compare two individ-
uals who attempted to establish their concepts and innovations
in their respective services against opposition; what they
proposed, how they worked, and why one failed while the other
succeeded. Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell of the
Army attempted to make the airplane the primary weapon in the
United States defense arsenal as well as create an independent
Air Force during the years of 1919-1925. Vice Admiral Hyman G.
Rickover of the Navy worked to develop nuclear propulsion and
to build an atomic submarine for the Navy during the years of
19^6-1952. Each officer's career and background, the state
and nature of the military establishment of their times, and
the peculiarities involved in the nature of the object and con-
cepts each attempted to introduce are subjects which have so
far never been explored on a comparative basis.
No attempt has been made to build an exhaustive bib-
liography of works on both Mitchell and Rickover. What has
been attempted is to gain an insight into the problems en-
countered by these men in their roles of military innovators
iv
and how each handled his problems In an attempt to achieve a
satisfactory conclusion. In other words, this is a comparative
study in the problems of technical innovation in the defense
services.
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CHAPTEB I
MITCHELL'S AND HICKOVER'o BACKGROUNDS
Brigadier General William Mitchell
William "Billy" Mitchell represented the third genera-
tion of a rather well-to-do and influential Wisconsin family.
He was born in Nice, France, where his parents were vacation-
ing, in December of 1879-
His grandfather, Alexander Mitchell, a Scottish immi-
grant, amassed a considerable fortune through banking and
speculating in railroads, but little of this money remained by
the time "Billy" could have inherited it, for John Lendrum
Mitchell, Bill's father, spent well without adding to his
capital while the largest share was lost in the panic of 1897'
Other than being too liberal with money, the senior Mitchell
was a successful politician who represented his state in the
United States Senate from 1895-1905. 1
William Mitchell inherited a record of success and
enviable achievement on the part of his grandfather and father
that would be hard to follow. In Wisconsin the Mitchell name
was sure to open doors closed to most others, while his father
Major Alfred Hurley, USAF, Billy Mitchell; Crusader
for Airpower (New York: Franklin Watts, 1954;, 2.
2being a Senator also helped to assure William Mitchell of a
more than average chance of success. So it seemed that the
future General would only have to choose his field and family
inertia would provide the initial propelling force for a rapid
rise. To the dismay of his family, he chose the Army.
William Mitchell's early youth was spent on the family
estate in Wisconsin where he became an expert horseman which
was to be a great practical value to him during his early years
in the Army. Educated at an Episcopal preparatory school and
Racine College in Milwaukee, he entered Columbian University
in Washington, D. C, now George Washington University, in the
fall of 1895. 2
When the Spanish-American War began in 1898 he was a
junior and, of his own admission, was thoroughly bored with
school work. The war seemed to offer him the excitement that
he was looking for and over the objections of his parents, his
father was against the war, he left school and enlisted as a
private in the First Wisconsin, a volunteer regiment. Although
they had objected to his joining the Army, this did not prevent
his family from looking out for his best interests once he had
committed himself. Arriving in Florida with his company, he
accepted the opportunity of becoming a Second Lieutenant in the
Signal Corps then commanded by General Adolphus Greeley, a
z
family friend.
2Hurley, Billy Mitchell
. 3-
3
'Isaac Don Levine, Mitchell, Pioneer of Airpower (New
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943;, 22.
3To his extreme disappointment he did not reach Cuba
until after the war had ended. While there he helped string
telegraph lines to provide a communications system for the
Army. But, occupation duty was not what he had in mind when
he enlisted and he constantly wrote to his parents pleading
with them to use their influence to get him transferred to the
Philippines where the guerrilla campaign against Aguinaldo's
lnsurreot03 was just beginning. In the end Mitchell's plead-
ing prevailed against the real wishes of his parents, and he
was transferred to the Philippines.
The campaign there provided young Mitchell with every
ounce of excitement for which he had been looking. The rigors
of the guerrilla campaign and the wild jungle terrain over
which much of it was carried on was a sufficient test for any
man. The young lieutenant bandied himself very well and did
an excellent job of providing the division of Arthur MacArthur,
father of Douglas MacArthur, with telegraph communication. The
high point of his service in the Philippine campaign came when
he captured Aguinaldo's Adjutant General, Mendoza.
Whereas the drab occupation duty in Cuba had soured
him somewhat on army life, the excitement of the Philippines
probably first made him give serious consideration to the Army
as a career possibility.
4
Levine, Mitchell
. 37-
5Ruth Mitchell, My Brother Bill (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1953), 57.
4With the acquisition of territories outside the con-
tinental United States the demands upon the Army increased,
requiring a much larger standing army than had ever been had
before. This was met by the Army Act passed by Congress in
February, 1901, which increased the size of the Regular Army
from 26,610 to 100,000 men. The moment of decision was at
hand for Mitchell, he was offered a commission as First
Lieutenant in the Signal Corps of the Regular Army. He had
entertained hopes of transferring to the cavalry but the
opportunity never presented itself and after little hesitation
he accepted the new commission becoming a Regular Army officer
on April 26, 1901. 6
Mitchell's next major tour of duty was in Alaska. The
Army Signal Corps was given the job of establishing communica-
tions in that neglected possession of the United States which
was experiencing a rapid influx of settlers as a result of the
discovery of gold, as well as becoming strategically important.
He spent two years in Alaska supervising the laying of tele-
graph lines. As a result of the excellent work he and his men
performed he was promoted in 1903 and at the age of twenty-four
he became the youngest captain in the Army. The Alaskan
expedition also gave him the material for an article which was
published in the National Geographic Magazine .
'
He returned from Alaska and married Caroline Stoddard.
6Hurley, Billy Mitchell
. 8.
7Mitchell, My Brother Bill , 176.
5The marriage seems to have been engineered by the mothers of
the couple who had been close friends since their school days.
His divorce, nineteen years later, was to be a source of em-
barrassment for him, coming at the time of his first "fight"
with the Navy over the results of the bombing tests conducted
against ships off the Virginia capes.
Mitchell's friendship with General Greeley gained him
an assignment at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the home of the
Infantry and Cavalry School as well as of the newly founded
Staff College and Signal School. Mitchell served as an
instructor in the Signal School and commanded the Signal
Company at the Fort.
This was a very choice assignment and could not have
come at a better time. He had ample field experience from his
work in Cuba, the Philippines, and Alaska. Uhat he needed now
was more theoretical knowledge and this he was able to receive
at Leavenworth. Also very helpful was the fact that as com-
mander of the post Signal Company he had to provide signal
support for all field maneuvers of the Infantry and Cavalry
School as well as the Staff College, thus helping him to test
any new ideas and concepts on the spot.
By 1907, Mitohell had held responsibilities very few
officers of his age could match. He had an enviable record
and to many officers who knew him, as well as to himself, he
seemed to be well on his way to a high position in the Army.
This conviction was furthered when, in 190?, he was the first
6signal officer to attend the School of the Line and after that,
the Staff College. 8
After another two-year tour of duty in the Philippines
Mitchell's promise of greatness seemed to climb on an even
firmer footing when in 1912, still as a captain, he was chosen
one of twenty officers to serve on the Army General Staff.
His exuberance over this appointment as well as his goal can
be seen in a letter to his mother: "If fortunate, I may be a
qgeneral before many years have passed." 7
By the time he arrived in Washington, 0. C, Mitchell
was thirty-two and had fourteen years service to his credit.
He put all of his energy into the new job, one of the benefits
of which, in his opinion, was the chance to cultivate social
and political contacts. The high pace of his social life
required more money than was available to him from his captain's
salary, and he frequently had to borrow from his mother.
It was at this time that Mitchell first took an interest
in aeronautics. Since aviation was a division of the Signal
Corps and Mitchell was the only Signal Corps officer on the
General Staff, it was only natural that such problems as in-
volved aviation should be referred to him. This though was
not his primary job as a member of the General Staff. It is
interesting to note that Mitchell fully agreed that aviation
8Hurley, Billy Mitchell . 12.
9Ibid . . 15.
10Ibid.
should be kept as a branch of the Signal Corps, and with
legislation restricting flying duty to unmarried officers not
older than thirty.
When the war in Europe began, he wanted to go there as
an official observer from the United States but his request
was denied. So, when his tour of duty with the General Staff
ended, in 1915, he was promoted to major and assigned to the
Aviation Section. He was happy about his new assignment for
it represented a return to command thus relieving him of the
desk work to which he had been limited while on the Staff.
Along with building up the Aviation Section he began
to take a personal interest in flying and, at his own expense,
took flying lessons. At last, because of his staff background,
his position in the Aviation Section, and his qualification
as a pilot, Mitchell was assigned as an aeronautical observer
12
and sent to iSurope in March, 1917. By the time he reached
France, the United States had declared war on Germany, and he
busily set out to study Allied aviation. He reached the rather
obvious conclusion that Great Britain, France, and Germany had
far outpaced the United States in this aspect of warfare and
he became an avid student of French and English equipment,
methods, and policies. In seeing the employment of the air-
plane on the World War I battlefield and in talking with the
11Burke Davis, The Billy Mitchell Affair (New York:
Handom House, 1967), 24-.
12Levine, Mitchell . 89.
8Allied airmen he came to an understanding of the potentialities
of airpower not yet appreciated in the United States. The
chief influence upon him at this time was probably Major-
General Sir Hugh Trenchard, commander of the British Royal
Flying Corps, in whom Mitchell, no doubt, saw visions of him-
self and the possibilities of his future. Trenchard advocated
use of the airplane as an offensive weapon, to be used directly
against enemy forces in destroying their will and means to
sustain operations in the field, rather than relegating the
airplane merely to the role of an infantry observation and
support weapon. * Mitchell was not only exposed to this con-
cept theoretically, but saw it in actual practice.
In the Uivelle offensive, the French had concentrated
all of their fighter aircraft under the control of an air
officer not attached to a ground commander in an attempt to
engage the German airplanes and through a campaign of attrition
drive them out of the skies. Once this end was to have been
accomplished, the French airplanes would have free reins to
make deep thrusts into the German rear areas to interdict
their lines of communication and supply, thus effectively
limiting their fighting capabilities at the front.
While the French attempt to drive the German air force
out of the skies failed, Mitchell nevertheless was in sympathy
with their aims and concurred in their line of thought.
Mitchell of course also realized that the success of an air
15Ibid.
, 96.
9force in this type of an independent role would no longer rele-
gate it to the role of an auxiliary of the land forces. As
an arm capable of independently producing a decision on the
battlefield its status would be greatly enhanced as would
Mitchell's position within the American defense structure as
one of the leaders of Army aviation.
Also of great interest to Mitchell was the General
Headquarters Brigade of the Hoyal Flying Corps, established by
Trenchard, which was not attached to a ground unit. Its role
was, as Trenchard explained, to work against the German army's
capabilities of procuring replacements, supplies, and conduct-
M-ing combat operations.
Mitchell was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in May of
1917. By September he became a full Colonel.
Pershing arrived in France in early June, 1917, and
made Mitchell his aviation officer. Mitchell thereupon recom-
mended the establishment of a tactical and strategical aviation
force with the tactical giving support to ground operations
while the strategic would operate much like the General Head-
quarters Brigade of the RFC. While Pershing did not immedi-
ately act on Mitchell ' s suggestion of a strategic aviation
force, he did, in late June, create the Air Service of the
American .Expeditionary Force, separating it from the Signal
Corps on the suggestion of a board he had created to study the
aviation needs of the AEF. Mitchell had been a member of this
10
board.
In January 1918 Mitchell was made Chief of the Air
Service, First Army. His immediate superior was Brigadier
General Benjamin Foulois, Chief of the Air Service, ASF. The
two did not get along. One of the reasons for the animosity
between the two men undoubtedly was that Mitchell felt he
should have received that appointment. With the top two men
in the Air Service at odds, not much was being accomplished in
the way of organizing aeronautics for the AEF so Pershing
appointed Major General Mason Patrick to head it. Foulois now
took over Mitchell's job while Mitchell dropped to head of the
air arm of the First Brigade. The drop was unbearable to
Mitchell and his quarrel and disrespect for Foulois, still his
superior, came into the open. Foulois backed down with the
result that Mitchell regained his position as Chief of the
Air Service, First Army, but his highanded treatment of
Foulois left him some enemies. '
As the air chief of the First Army he won the respect
of his superiors and subordinates for his bravery in the air
and also for the competent way in which he carried out his
work, especially in both the St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne
offensives. At St. Mihiel he was the over-all commander of
a joint Allied air force consisting of some 1,500 airplanes,
the largest number assembled for any single battle during the
war. Outnumbering the Germans eight to one, this force
15Ibid .
. 34.
11
quickly gained air superiority and this success brought
Mitchell promotion to Brigadier General. But due to a German
withdrawal in that sector Mitchell was unable to test his
force in attacking such strategic objectives as the enemy's
communication and supply system, in order to gain an objective
appraisal of the effects of such an action. In the Meuse-
Argonne offensive he was never able to free his force from
supporting the ground forces so again he was unable to test
some of his ideas.
The war ended with Mitchell fully convinced that in
future wars the airplane would play a decisive, if not domin-
ant role. While most airmen were of this opinion, they really
had no concrete justification for these beliefs as they had
not been able to test their advanced theories, for airplanes
had been used mainly as ground support weapons. The new
weapon in the air had only had time to prove itself within the
existing framework of traditional organization and doctrine.
It had not had time to effect its own changes on the older
forms of organization. Therefore, when Mitchell returned to
the United States in 1919 fully convinced of the necessity of a
strong aviation policy on the part of the military and the
government in civil aeronautics, his views were shared by only
a few farsighted individuals while most were quite willing to
keep the airplane and the air doctrine at the World War I ground
support level. He was dismayed, but not disheartened, for
he felt he was right and that he could convince others that
12
he was right. And, once the airplane was given its proper
role in the military establishment of the country, at its head,
his future and fame as eventual commander of that body would
be assured.
Vice Admiral Hyman G. Hickover
In contrast to Mitchell, Hyman George rtickover was
born to a Polish immigrant, who had settled in Chicago, on
January 27, 1900. He grew up in the shadow of poverty and
never knew the luxury of leisure time. When not in school he
worked to help balance the family budget. While his record
in high school was nothing of which to boast, he nevertheless
secured an appointment to the U. 3. Naval Academy at Annapolis.
To the surprise of many, he passed the entrance examinations
and entered the Academy in 1918.
While at the Academy he tried on a number of occasions
to break out of the isolationist shell he had built around
himself. But each time he was rebuffed and finally resigned
himself to purely academic pursuits. He graduated in the
upper one-fourth of his class, but left his classmates with
the impression of being, at best, a very mediocre person.
He graduated in 1922 and received his first assignment
aboard the destroyer La Vallette . Conscientiously he set
about his work and soon became the Kngineering Officer,
Robert Wallace, "A Deluge of Honors for an Exasper-
ating Admiral," Life . XL, (September 8, 1958), 110.
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somewhat of an honor for an ensign and it attests to his hard
work and the favorable impression he had made with his
superiors on the ship. Next came an appointment to the battle-
ship Nevada , where he again distinguished himself by his hard
work and was rewarded, while still an ensign, by being
appointed the Electrical Officer of the ship, a position
usually held by an officer of higher rank. '
After five years of duty aboard ship Rickover took,
and passed, the Navy-wide competitive examinations for gradu-
ate school. His graduate work was in electrical engineering,
an area in which he had developed quite an interest as a
result of his position on Nevada . By the time be had com-
pleted his degree at the Columbia University School of
Engineering he had also received his promotion to Lieutenant,
Senior Grade. Rickover now decided that submarine duty would
provide him the best chances for promotion and an early
independent command. So, although his orders assigned him as
Electrical Officer of the battleship California , he managed
to get them changed to the Submarine School at New London,
Connecticut.
His first duty aboard a submarine provided many
challenges as S-46 experienced a multitude of difficulties
18because of poor design. But, as a result of his rebuilding
'Clay Blair, Jr., The Atomic Submarine and Admiral
Rickover (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 19W. 4-3.
18Ibid.
,
50-51.
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of equipment, his boat did not suffer many of the troubles
associated with its sisterships. Despite this he was dis-
appointed. He did not get an independent command and was
reassigned to the Office of the Inspector of Naval Material.
While still attached to S-48 he had found time to
marry Ruth Masters in 1931- He had met her at Columbia Uni-
versity where she was a graduate student in International Law.
After leaving school Hickover had kept up a steady correspond-
ence with her and when she received her PhD. , they were
married.
In 193^ Hickover returned to sea-duty, this time
aboard another battleship, New Mexico . As Assistant Engineer-
ing Officer he won the respect of his fellow officers and the
praise of the captain who noted that Hickover was one of the
19hardest working men on the ship. *
His first independent command finally came in 1937*
but it must have seemed more like a demotion than a promotion.
He became captain of Finch , a rusty old mine sweeper stationed
in China whose principal task was target towing for fleet
gunnery practice. His ambitions of independent command, the
dream of every naval officer, had been so blunted by his fail-
ure to get a submarine command and his disappointment with
Finch , that he decided to continue his career in a specialized
status and abandon further attempts to get command of a ship.
He applied for status as an Engineering Duty Only (EDO) officer,
'Blair, Atomic Submarine
, 57.
15
20
which, when it was granted, relieved hia of command of Finch .
Any hopes of a successful naval career now hinged on his
making a name for himself as a specialized engineering officer.
He fully realized that the opportunities for promotions were
not as great for specialized as for regular line officers.
With his new EDO rating Rickover was assigned to the
Philippines for work as a Planning Officer at the Cavite Navy-
Yard. He stayed there for eighteen months, raising its effi-
ciency and making a general nuisance of himself by forcing
individual ships to perform much maintenance that the yard had
heretofore unnecessarily done for them.
Assigned to the Electrical Section of the Bureau of
Ships in 1959, he became its head in 19*0. While this was
not command of a ship, it did provide him the measure of
authority and leadership he had wanted and it was in a field
in which he was thoroughly grounded. He built the Electrical
Section into a personally-selected, cohesive, and close-working
team, much the same as he was to do later with the men working
toward the atomic submarine. His energy and technical compe-
tence soon led him to reforms of navy electrical equipment
that were to be of considerable value in World War II. For
example, he compiled a new catalogue of electrical equipment
that cut out needless stock duplication and thereby reduced
size of inventories. He also initiated the redesigning of
much electrical equipment making it more compact and sturdier.
20
^Wallace, "A Deluge of Honors," Life
. 109.
16
He began work on anti-magnetic mine warfare equipment, and
21
rushed to completion work on an infrared signalling device.
The tactics he used in initiating and completing projects
which often had not received official sanction by the Navy
were highly irregular and at times approached the illegal.
But, it was his ability to correctly analyze future needs and
to rush to quick completion a project before it was stalled
that saved his often dangerously outstretched neck.
His ability to get things done and the expansion of
the Navy immediately preceding United States involvement in
the war got him two quick promotions, to Commander and then
to Captain.
As head of the Electrical Section of the Bureau of
Ships until late 1944, Hickover was awarded the Legion Of
Merit. A General Electric vice-president complimented Hickover
by saying he saved the government hundreds of millions of
dollars. This was an exceptional compliment considering its
source, for Hickover was very hard on the big industrial firms,
threatening them with loss of contracts if they did not comply
with the rules he set up for them in handling naval contracts
and often, in effect, telling these firms how they should run
22their own businesses.
In 1944, at his own request, Rickover left the
21New York Times . October 23, 1953, 15-
22
Ronald Schiller, "The Strange Case of the Man Behind
the Atomic Submarine," Reader's Digest , LXII, (May, 1953),
47-50.
17
23Electrical Section for an overseas assignment. Before he
was sent to Okinawa to head a fleet repair base which was
being prepared for the invasion of the Japanese islands he
helped restore the Navy's supply depot at Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania, to the high degree of efficiency from which it
had fallen. Rickover, by this time, had gained the reputation
of being able to solve difficult administrative problems, a
vital attribute in directing large-scale operations.
He arrived on Okinawa in July, 19*5 • When the Japanese
surrendered in August his job was no longer necessary and he
began to supervise the return of machinery and equipment to
the United States.
His next job, Chief Material Officer for the 19th Fleet
saw him speeding up and assuring the proper mothballing of
many of the 19th Fleet ships. He formed a team which soon
became famous on the west coast for appearing at inopportune
moments and checking every minute part of a ship being moth-
balled. Eickover became a dreaded name in the 19th Fleet.
For his outstanding performance, his superior, Admiral R. S.
Oil
Edwards, recommended him for flag rank.
It was at this time that the Navy and the then Army
Air Force received an Invitation to take part in the building
of a nuclear reactor. The possibilities for the use of atomic
23
'Blair, Atomic Submarine
. 71.
OIL
Schiller, "Man Behind the Atomic Submarine,"
Reader's Digest , 48.
18
power in airplanes and ships was the justification for asking
these services to send liaison officers to the nuclear reactor
project. The Navy had mixed emotions as to the feasibility
of atomic power for ships, but the general consensus was that
if it did come about, it would be a thing in the distant
future. Anyway, the Navy decided to send eight men to the
project and began to seek volunteers. Hickover, Chief Material
Officer of the 19th Fleet applied. It was a gamble, tying his
career to something relatively new, untried, and untested, but
he had been able to project the future needs of the Navy before
and to him it seemed a fair gamble. It also may have been
that he saw in atomic power for the Navy his last chance to
further his career. Prom this viewpoint his application was
not a gamble but a necessary step. He was a senior Captain in
1946 and the Navy was rapidly reverting to peace-time strength.
As the size of the Navy decreased, chances of promotion also
became smaller especially for a man like Hickover who had not
held a combat command during the war. His talents lay in
handling large administrative organizations and in getting jobs
done quickly. The size and leisurely pace of a peace-time
Navy did not place a premium on these attributes. In fact,
his ramrodding methods were even resented as the emphasis
shifted from the wartime necessity of getting a job done as
quickly as possible to doing it by the proper methods and
regulations. Rickover concerned himself only with the "ends"
while the Navy began to emphasize the "means."
Nevertheless Rickover was chosen to head the eight-man
19
naval team being sent to Oak Ridge. Along with Rickover went
four other navy officers and three civilians from the Bureau
of Ships. 25
When Rickover was chosen for the Oak Ridge project in
May of 1946 he was forty-six years old. Twenty-four of those
years had been spent on active duty in the Navy and four more
at the Naval Academy. His fitness reports had praised his
work aboard ship as a junior officer and the Legion of Merit,
as well as Admiral Edwards' recommendation of flag rank for
him, attested to his performance during the war as a senior
officer. But, he also had the reputation of being an unsociable
and disagreeable officer who often worked outside the normal
Navy channels of procedure and who seemed to have a knack of
antagonizing the persons with whom he worked. Ue had openly,
at times, criticised the Navy for being too tradition bound.
He had made enemies within the Navy and in private industry.
But, he had also earned the respect, if not the friendship,
of many naval officers and the superiors under which he had
worked. There was not unanimity on the choice of Hickover
for the Oak Kidge job because his controversial personality
was thought by some to be a handicap for the job; so, another
26
captain almost received the appointment. Within the next
six years neither skeptics nor supporters of Rickover were
25C. B. Palmer, "SSN-571, Making of the Atomic Sub-
marine," New York Times Magazine
.
(October 26, 1952), 14.
26
Blair, Atomic Submarine
. 18.
20
to be disappointed. He would continue antagonizing people and
working outside the normal naval channels while at the same
time he was to bring about a change in naval propulsion that
revolutionized the Navy and profoundly affected naval strategy
and the entire American defense structure.
Conclusions as to their Career Patterns
to the Beginning of their Campaigns
When Mitchell and Rickover began their respective
struggles within their services they both had fairly long
careers behind them, and were thus well acquainted with their
service. Rickover was slightly senior to Mitchell in length
of service. Not counting his four years at the academy, by
1946 he had twenty-four years in the Navy. Mitchell, in 1919
had twenty-one years in the service. Mitchell had risen from
the ranks while Rickover was an Annapolis graduate. Mitchell's
record though was more impressive than Rickover' s. His career
was highlighted by quick promotions and early independent com-
mands. Rickover had a rather normal record, his promotions
had come at expected intervals and his one command of a ship
had been a discouraging and uneventful experience which led
him to become a specialized "Engineering Duty Only" officer.
Both men had served in important positions during a
major war. Mitchell had the fortune of occupying the top com-
bat position in the Air Service of the American Expeditionary
Force and he built a reputation as a very able and courageous
commander. Rickover headed the Electrical Section of the
Bureau of Ships for most of World War II. In this position
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and as Inspector of the 19th Fleet he became known as a very
efficient administrator. In war though, careers are not made
as an administrator in rear areas. They are made at the front.
Rickover undoubtedly realized this when he asked for an
assignment in the Pacific in 1944-. Unfortunately for him the
war ended by the time he got there.
Mitchell, as a front line commander, had become a
public figure and this assured him of a high position in the
peace-time Army. Rickover's war record left doubts as to what
his position would be in the post-war Navy. Both men had made
enemies among their fellow officers during the war, but while
Mitchell had also actively cultivated politicians and had some
influential connections in Congress, Hickover, on the other
hand, was practically an isolate, having no such connections
and only the recommendations of a few superior officers to
commend him.
In 1919 the future career of Brigadier General William
Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the U. S. Army Air Service seemed
bright. In contrast, in 1946, that of Captain Hyman G.
Rickover, U. 3. Navy, was an open question.
CHAPTER II
THE CLIMATES OP THE STHUGGLES
The Public and Political Climates and
Foreign Policy Considerations
In order to understand the climate of opinion in which
Mitchell attempted to get his ideas accepted, it is necessary
to take a look at the nation, Congress, and the first two post
World War I Presidents.
The spirit of the nation after World War I contrasted
sharply with pre-war Frogressivism and Wilson's "New Freedom.
"
The fears of some Americans expressed before the war that
participation in the war would undermine Frogressivism came
true. The hatreds aroused by the war, its cruelties, and the
disillusionment afterwards, engendered a spirit opposite that
of the humanitarian concern which had fostered Frogressivism.
The Progressive movement also died, in part, a normal death.
Such a long liberal movement, over a generation old, was bound
to falter. 1
Thus the moral and cultural relapse from Frogressivism
together with a series of conflicts at home—labor troubles,
David A. Shannon (ed.), Propsresslvlsm and Post-War
Disillusionment. 1898-1928 (New rorkT McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1966;, 273.
22
23
race riots in the summer of 1919, "Red" scares, and economic
recession from 1920 to 1921—combined to focus the attention
of Americans on purely domestic affairs, bringing about a
desire and a demand for a return to "normalcy." The exasper-
ation as a result of the post-war mess and the anti-Wilson
attitude was clearly expressed in the election of 1920 where
the slogan promising the "return to normalcy" carried Harding
into the White House on an "earthquake."
The adjective "simple" which Harding used to describe
the business of government can perhaps be put to better use in
describing the man himself. He had little understanding of
either domestic problems or foreign affairs. He candidly con-
ceded that, "I don't know anything about this European stuff."
His lack of understanding might have been excusable had he
attempted to educate himself in these matters. Arthur 5.
Draper, of the New York Tribune, wrote that Harding's personal
secretary, Judson C. Welliver, told him "how difficult it was
o
to get the President interested in foreign affairs."
While Harding at least managed to be interested in
domestic problems, even here he did not have a sufficient
understanding of the two pressing issues of the day, taxes and
tariffs, to deal with either effectively. He was a man of the
party. He even attempted to bring back the patronage system
by issuing an executive order shifting 13,000 post-masterships
2Samuel H. Adams, Incredible Lra: The Life and Times
of Warren S. Harding (Boston! Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939),
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from the protection of the Civil Service regulations. The
cabinet he chose was more interested in spoils than service
to the country. Their best service to Harding was in pro-
viding him with a close group from which to draw players
for poker games.
Unfortunately at the same time that leadership was
lacking in the White House, it was not to be found in Congress
either. In the Senate, Lodge, who at the head of the
"irreconcilables" had managed to keep the United States out
of the League of Nations, was losing his control. Factional
dissentions split the Republican Party. In the House of
Representatives Speaker Gillett had also passed his peak.
There were enough insurgents in both Houses of Congress to
"cause legislative uncertainty and, for a time, legislative
impotence." Adding to the troubles caused by opposing fac-
tions within each House was a lack of agreement between the
Houses. They were continuously quarreling with each other
over tariff duties.
The general situation was one of indecisiveness and
inaction in both the executive and legislative branches during
the Harding administration. The President would not initiate
programs on his own. He waited for directions and orders from
his party which was split and could not reach agreement on
3Ibid.
,
226.
^Ibid. 225.
5Ibid., 230.
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major issues.
When Coolidge came to office, after the death of
Harding, the "era of good feeling" had penetrated throughout
America. Industry and the economy had revived by 1923.
Americans wanted, above all, to be left alone to enjoy their
new found prosperity. Public affairs during the Harding and
Coolidge eras were considered dull topics. The White House
had a complacency about it that reflected the general mood
of the country. With Coolidge, the measuring stick by which
the government operated became economy, and its major inter-
est lay in maintaining the business prosperity of the country.
Coolidge expressed it as "the business of this country is
business." H. L. Mencken's essay entitled "Golden Age" cap-
tures this singular emphasis on business, money, and pros-
perity in the "twenties" better than anything else.
The United States, I believe, is the first great empire
in the history of the world to ground its whole national
philosophy upon business ... no other human activity
brings such great rewards in money and power, and none
is more lavishly honored.
6
Speaking of Coolidge in the same essay he wrote:
The man's merits, in the Babbitt view, are almost
fabulous ... in him the philosophy of Babbitt
comes to its perfect and transcendental form.'
The main objectives of American foreign policy that
directly affected the military in the early twenties were the
Shannon, ProRressivism , 290.
7Ibid . . 291.
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security of the continental United States and the Panama Canal,
the defense of our possessions in the Pacific, and the con-
tinued development of economic interests on the mainland of
Asia. The way in which the military would support these
objectives was determined by the public desire for peace and
reduction of military expenditures.
By the very nature of these objectives and the geo-
graphic location of the United States it can be seen that the
Navy was to be the dominant service in the defense structure.
There was little danger of an attack on the United States from
a base in the Western Hemisphere. An attacking force would
have to be transported by ship and thus would encounter the
fleet first. The defense of our possessions in the Pacific
would also rest primarily on the strength of our fleet. Our
economic interests in Asia could be safeguarded by a strong
American naval force in the Pacific.
Thus the Navy was given the preeminent position in
the planning of the General Board of the Army and Navy which
logically concluded in 1921 that the United States should have
Q
a Navy second to none. In fact, in view of the alliance
between Great Britain and Japan, with whom our policies in
Asia were recognized to become a source of friction soon, the
desire was to build a Navy equal in size to any combination
of two other powers.
Q
Raymond G. O'Connor (ed.), American Defense Policy
in Perspective (New rork: John Wiley and Sons, 1965;, 188.
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A naval 'building race began between the United States,
Japan, and Great Britain. This, however, ran counter to the
movement in the United States for the reduction and limitation
in armaments of the military establishment. As a result there
was Congressional stiffening in this country to the increasing
naval expenditures which forced the diplomats to seek other
means to reach their goal of having a Navy strong enough to
support foreign policy objectives. The search for other means
led to the Washington Naval Conference which established a
fixed sea-power relationship between these nations in capital
ships, a desirable settlement for the Harding administration
in view of U. 3. public opinion.
The important aspect of these policies in relation to
Mitchell was that the Navy was consciously given the primary
role in the defense structure while the Army was relegated to
a secondary role. The United States foreign policy objectives
dictated a large Navy. In arguing that the airplane made the
battleship obsolete Mitchell also had to show that the airplane
could support foreign policy as well as the Mahanian battleship.
The indifferent attitude on the part of the American
public toward foreign affairs in the "twenties" was possible
because the balance of power in Europe worked without the
involvement of the United States. The United States could
wait, as she did in World War I, until her vital interests
were determined before she committed herself. After World
War II though the old balance of power system broke down and
28
the United States found that she alone was left facing an
aggressive Soviet Union. The realization gradually broke
across America that the traditional retreat to isolation was
no longer possible and that the affairs in Europe, and all
q
over the world, were of vital concern to her.
This realization did not come easy. If there was one
overriding policy in the conduct of the war it was to get it
over as quickly as possible and then to return home to con-
tinue what the war had interrupted. 1946 though was to prove
a year of frustration for the United States. The intransigence
of the Hussians and their refusal to cooperate with the former
allies in establishing post-war Europe on the basis of the
Atlantic Charter forced the administration toward the early
formulation of a foreign policy of involvement. The potential
enemy of the United States was clearly the Soviet Union.
Russia, as George F. Kennan had warned, was expanding its in-
fluence by military pressures throughout the world. The
initial response to these pressures was, however, only a verbal
firmness in dealings with the Hussians. The United States
could not have made a military response even if she had wanted
to, for a fast dismantling of the military machine had begun
immediately after the cessation of hostilities with Japan.
This process could not be reversed. In 1°A5 the public
clamored to have the "boys" back home while the "boys" staged
"Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), 102.
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demonstrations demanding a quick return to the United States
and discharge from the service. Congress joined the band-
wagon by holding investigations to make sure that the services
were doing everything possible for the speedy release of
servicemen.
By March, 1946, the Navy had been reduced from its
wartime peak of 3,400,000 men to less than 1,600,000. The
size of the Army had shrunk even faster. The Army Air Force
had 218 combat groups on V-J day while on January 1, 1946, it
could count only 109 combat groups. Thus while the admin-
istration was attempting to take a firm stand against the
Russian expansion it was losing its means to check this expan-
sion. Foreign and military policy were travelling in opposite
directions. When the State Department Policy Planning Section,
created by the new Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
developed three alternative measures of dealing with Russia,
to fight and destroy her, to permit her indefinite expansion,
or to regulate our policies to halt any further expansion, the
only logical alternative, in view of our military situation,
was the third.
This policy of containment, as it came to be known,
produced the cold war and necessitated the maintenance of
stronger peacetime military forces than at any other time in
O'Connor, American Defense Policy . 299
•
Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 72.
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the history of the United States. The requirements dictated
to the military in the cold war were to help other nations
resist aggression, to be able to retaliate effectively against
the Soviet homeland should a major war develop, and to act
as a deterrent to war by maintaining a high degree of
12
readiness.
By the time this policy was formulated, the American
public had become sufficiently roused by world instability,
the well publicized Soviet threat, and the failure to reach
any agreement on the control of nuclear weapons, to support
an enlargement of the military establishment. In fact,
pessimism about our relations with the Soviet Union and the
increasing sense of imminence of war caused a majority of
persons to desire such an increase. An American Institute of
Public Opinion (AIPO) survey sent out on February 4, 1948,
after the tax costs of military increases were made clear,
indicated that 63 per cent still favored a larger Air Force,
55 per cent a larger Army, and 55 per cent a larger Navy.
An independent Fortune survey released in June 1946 showed
that over eighty per cent of Americans favored an increase in
14
military strength.
Thus the general attitude toward defense and what was
12Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic
iTOKrams in National Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1961}, 35.
^Almond, Foreign Policy
. 104.
14
"The Fortune Survey," Fortune
. XXiVII, (June, 1948),
5-12.
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expected of the military was very different after World War II
from what it was after World War I.
The Army in the Late "Twenties'1 and the Wavy
in the Late "Forties"
That the 1920' s were years of disillusionment in the
United States was nowhere more evident than in the opinions
expressed about the World War and the general establishment of
the armed forces. The almost unanimous public feeling was
that participation in the last war had been a mistake. The
result of this climate of opinion was an immediate and sharp
cutback in the size of the Army. As was noted, the size of
the Navy was also curtailed by the Washington Naval Conference
of 1921. The Army though suffered more than the Navy. Since
the prevailing opinion was that the United States would never
again involve itself in a war outside the Western Hemisphere,
no need was seen for an Army competitive in sise with the
European models. The ideal was again expressed of a small
Army whose primary function was to be a training nucleus in
the event that war should somehow be forced upon the country.
Thus, by 1920, the Army found itself, in the space of
a few short months since the end of the war, in a fight for
survival. The very enviable position occupied in 1918 was
gone by 1920, though not without a fight. The end result of
the Army's attempt to maintain some of its strength was the
National Defense Act of 1920. Written largely by the General
•'O'Connor, American Defense Policy . 215.
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Staff of the Army, it became law on June 4, 1920, but without
a general provision for compulsory military training that both
the General Staff and Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker,
wanted and had included in the original draft of the bill.
Nevertheless, the act initially seemed a victory for the Army
and had its provisions been carried out in full it would have
provided the basis for a strong peacetime Army.
Within a year of the passage of the Act, however,
appropriations had reduced the strength of the Regular Army
from the authorized 280,000 officers and men to 150,000. This
reduction continued until by 1955 the strength of the Army was
only 118,750 officers and men. Not only was the strength
of the Army drastically reduced by the lack of sufficient
appropriations, equipment also suffered. The Army had to make
use of all the obsolete and worn out 1918 equipment as meager
appropriations could not be stretched for the purchase of new
material. Although the Army actively sought more money,
Congress could not be shaken out of the isolationist tradition
to which it had returned or out of the belief that the two
oceans separating the United States from the continents of
Europe and Asia were the best defenses of the country. The
Mead Committee of 194-6, investigating America's unpreparedness
for World War II, has attempted to shift some of the blame for
the inter-war deterioration of the Army onto the Army itself.
Gordon 3. Turner, (ed.) A History of Military
Affairs Since the j,ip;b.teenta Century (New Xork: Bar-court,
Brace and Co., 1956.), 474.
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It has suggested that a lack of initiative on the part of Army
representatives resulted in the low Congressional appropria-
tions. It intimated that many persons in the military were
complacent and willing to rest on their laurels until retire-
ment. Therefore, "largely as a result of this attitude
^complacency/ Congressional appropriations for the support of
18
our national defense were reduced to a dangerous minimum.
"
Certainly after a budget had been approved the Army
did little to get more money than they were allocated for a
particular fiscal year. Major General Dennis E. Nolan, in
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in 1925,
made the position of the Army clear by stating that:
... we are prohibited by law from asking Congress for
anything except the amount that is allowed here in the
budget . . . because Congress passed a Budget Law, in
which there is a provisio prohibiting any official of
the government coming before a committee of Congress
and arguing for more money than is permitted under the
Budget sent up by the President. That is a matter of
But, while representatives of the Army felt, by law
unable to attempt to get more money once the budget had been
set, they often vigorously expressed their views from other
platforms.
In his annual reports of 1921, 1922, 1923, Secretary
of War John Weeks gave warning that "our present combat
^Turner, History of Military Affairs . 4-70.
18O'Connor, American Defense Policy , 217.
19Ibid. , 218.
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strength will be insufficient to fulfill the functions re-
quired by our national defense policy." In 1925, General
John J. Pershing complained that "under our very eyes there
21have already been serious reductions made by Congress."
Army officers testifying before the numerous boards of inquiry
into the armed services in the 1920' s always stressed the
fact that lack of funds was lowering their operating efficiency
to a dangerous level.
In 1921 the Army asked for appropriations amounting to
5982,800,020. This was reduced by Congress to 4377.246, 944. 2Z
In 1922, the same thing happened. The War Department pre-
sented a budget of 8699,275,502.93, but only received
8386,824,212.41. * The Army appropriations for 1923 amounted
to 6330, 074, 738. 74.
24
By 1926, the appropriation was still only a meager
8332, 616, 631. 25 From 1927 until 1930, there were small in-
creases each year. In 1930, War Department expenditures had
20Turner, History of Military Affairs , 4?1.
O'Connor, American Defense Policy , 217.
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"War Department Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year
1921," U. 3. House of Representatives Report Ho. 821 . 66 Cong.,
2nd 3ess. (April 13, 1920;, 1.
^"War Department Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year
1923," U. 3. House of Representatives Report No. 791 . 67 Cong.,
2nd Sess. (March 15, 1922;, 2.
24
Ibid.
2
^"War Department Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year
1927," U. 3. House of Representatives Report Ho. 197 . 69th
Cong. , 1st Sess. (February 4, 1926;, 2.
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reached $454,089,562. The feelings of the Army regarding these
low appropriations have already been noted in the quoted
statements of Secretary of War John Weeks and General Pershing.
Obviously the Congress, and it must be assumed the general
public, felt quite the opposite. The attitude in Congress is
probably best expressed in a House Appropriations Committee
Report of 1925:
Hever in the history of this country has it had so
great a military strength in time of peace as it has
today. Never before has the country possessed so 2g
many military resources in trained men and material.
The general anti-military attitude can be seen in the
unsuccessful attempt by the Army in 1922 to institute a pro-
gram of vocational training for its enlisted men. This was
looked upon as a devious plot on the part of the War Depart-
ment to enter into the field of education and thereby in-
doctrinate those it taught with a spirit of militarism.
Representative Thomas U. Sisson of Mississippi stated in the
House that this was an attempt by the Army at "Prussianization"
of the American people. ' The entire program for vocational
training met with 3uch staunch opposition that the Army
dropped it.
As seen by its officers, the Army of the 1920' s was
in dire straits. The large and efficient military machine
26
"War Department Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Ifear
1924," P. S. House of representatives Report Ho. 1.597 . 67th
Cong. , 4th Sess. (January 12, 1925), 7.
27
'U. o. Congressional Record , 67 Cong., 2nd 3ess.
,
Iill, part 4 (March 22, 1922;, 4272-4274.
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built during the war had disappeared. The National Defense
Act of 1920, if carried through, would have at least provided
a solid nucleus for rapid expansion in time of need. Even
this objective was lost when appropriations reduced the size
of the Army from the projected 280,000 to around 120,000
officers and men. The effect this had on the efficiency of
the Army was described by General George C. Marshall in 19W,
when he was Chief of Staff.
During this period pearly 1920 's7 I commanded a post
which had for its garrison a battalion of infantry,
the basic fighting unit of every army. It was a
battalion only in name, for it could muster barely 200
men in ranks when every available man, including cooks,
clerks and kitchen police, (was) present for the
little field training that could be accomplished with
available funds. The normal strength of a battalion
in most armies of the world varies from 800 to 1,000
men . . .28
But, while the Army was extremely small, it remained
professional, and this is especially true of its officer
corps. The small core of high ranking officers that remained
in the post-war emaciated Army was a tight clique. It
shielded itself from the adverse criticism the armed forces
establishment received from the outside by a solidarity on the
inside. There was a strongly conscious feeling of unity among
the officers. They could be attacked from without and do
little. An attack from within however could be squarely met.
While the Army was fighting for its very existence against
external pressures, internal dissention approached the
28O'Connor, American Defense Policy , 220.
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treasonable in it3 eyes and could not be tolersted.
This was the framework in which General William
"Billy" Mitchell began his fight for more funds and recogni-
tion of the airplane as the primary weapon for the military
needs of the country. His rank of Brigadier General was only
a temporary one. He had not reverted to his permanent rank
of Colonel because he occupied the position of Assistant Chief
of the Air Service, which carried with it the rank of Brigadier
General
.
The most important change occurring within the Navy
after 19*5 was the emergence of a new leadership elite. The
wartime combat leaders returned to Washington to replace the
old wartime chiefs. These older Admirals such as Edwards and
Home were thoroughly schooled in Mahan's concepts and be-
lieved that the primary purpose of a navy was to engage and
destroy another navy. Thus they had emphasized the battleship
as the backbone of the fleet. The war in the Pacific however
brought into existence a new creation, the carrier task force
whose principal element was the aircraft carrier. It was
naval aviators, along with their champion, the new Secretary
of the Navy James Forrestal, who were inheriting command of
29
the Navy after the war.
From 19*1. to mid-19*5 the number of aviator admirals
'Vincent Davis, Post-War Defense Policy and the U. S.
Navy , 19*3-19*6 (Chapel Hill, N. C. : University of North
Carolina Press, 1962), 150.
58
had increased by six times, while the number of non-aviator
flag officers had increased only slightly more than two times
30
the number of 19*1. This increasing influence of the avia-
tors continued after the war. In 19*5 » 27 per cent of the
Navy flag officers were aviators, while 23.2 per cent of all
regular Navy officers were fliers. By 19*7, 3* per cent of
the flag officers were fliers and 31 per cent of all officers
were from aviation.
Submariners were also rising to higher positions in
the Navy throughout the war. By 19*5 1 20 per cent of the
flag officers were submariners.
The aviators enjoyed an organizational advantage, the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, which
aided them in their rise. In 19*2, DCNO (Air) got control of
the distribution of aviators and all training relating to
aviation personnel. It also had the authority to specify the
number of flag officers needed in the air arm. Thus the con-
trol of air officers in the Navy was completely in the hands
of aviators rather than being subject to the Bureau of Naval
33Personnel. ' As the percentages show, they made full use of
their authority to promote officers to flag rank.
To these aviators the lessons of Coral Sea and Midway
were clearly that the aircraft carrier was more powerful and
5
°Davis, U. S. Navy . 125.
51Ibid., 126-127. ?2Ibid
. . 133.
53 Ibid., 124.
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more flexible than the traditional "big-gun" battleship. Air-
planes from carriers could be used much more effectively
against ground forces as well as striking at targets deep in
enemy territory. Therefore, in their new position of promin-
ence the aviators speeded up the process, which had begun in
194-2, of turning Navy thinking away from a battleship-dominated
fleet. They were helped in this, as might be suspected, by
the submariners who had performed splendidly in the war and
were also demanding a larger position in the post-war Navy.
Another important factor in changing naval strategic
thoughts away from the battleship was the service unification
controversy and the related Navy-Air Force dispute that raged
throughout the late 1940' s.
In both of the above controversies the Navy felt that
its very existence was being challenged. It was afraid that
it would be gradually reduced in size and influence by a
coalition of the Army Air Force in a unified defense estab-
lishment with a single military chief of staff. The Air
Force also implied and often openly stated that the atomic
bomb had made navies obsolete, particularly surface ships,
and that any future war would begin and end by an exchange of
atomic weapons delivered directly on the enemy homeland
through the air. Therefore, the Navy was asked, and itself
felt the need, to present justification for its continued
existence as a major segment of the military establishment of
the country. It solved this, in part, by developing an atomic
40
delivery capability from carrier based planes and emphasizing
that in some cases strategic bombing would be more effectively
carried out by carrier based planes. They also emphasized
that the aircraft carrier allowed the Navy to participate
directly in operations against land forces. Thus the cause
of the naval aviators was aided by the dispute with the Air
Force which forced Navy thinking into new channels, away from
the battleship concept. The National Defense Act of 1°A7
ended the threat of the Navy being absorbed in a defense
structure dominated by the Army and the Air Force. But, the
Navy still felt it necessary to strengthen its case as a vital
service and contributor to the defense of the country. It
began to look for new roles and new concepts for seapower.
So, while the pre-war Navy, certain of its role, had
resisted technological change, the post-war Navy, unsure of
its role, began to promote it. A feeling gradually came about
that its future was dependent on being fully aware of, and in
step with, all technological changes. With the emphasis on
technology a number of high priority projects were begun in
aviation and submarine development. The interest in submarine
development was a natural continuation of the many improve-
ments that had been made in them during the war. It was also
a direct response to the contingency that the atomic bomb may
have, after all, made surface ships obsolete and that the
future of the Navy lay in warfare under the sea.
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Conclusions as to the respective
Environments of Struggle
The Army in the 1920 's bad changed little from what
it was before the war. The officers who were in high posi-
tions during the war largely remained in control after the
war. They were traditionalists and came from the old estab-
lished branches as Infantry, Artillery, and Engineers. The
two post-war chiefs of the Air Service were from the Infantry
and the Engineers. The Army's doctrine had undergone no
radical change as a result of the war. The airplane could
not claim a decisive role in defeating the enemy. One only
needs to note that the horse still had its place as an inte-
gral part of the army while spurs were still very much a part
of the uniform of every officer, to see how little the war
had influenced traditional thinking.
The Navy, on the other hand, had a decisive change in
leadership after World War II. Control of the post-war Navy
had passed to the aviators and to other young high ranking
officers returning from the combat theaters. The aircraft
carriers and the submarines had clearly been more decisive
than the battleship. There had been a major technological
breakthrough in the war, the atomic bomb, recognized by every-
one as a major new factor in warfare thus necessitating a
reinterpretation of the functions carried out by each service
in light of this new factor. The Navy, having its continued
value questioned, began to look for new roles and to encourage
technological innovations to keep current with the defense
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needs of the country and insure its continued existence.
The Army after World War I, although not of its own
choice, had quickly reverted to its traditional place in the
defense establishment which was a small force whose function
it was to provide the organizational framework for expansion
in case another war was thrust upon the United States. The
Navy after World War II was uncertain as to its role in the
defense structure. More important, it could not continue its
preoccupation with the Pacific which had dominated its plan-
ning in the 19th and 20th centuries until 1945. It therefore
had to develop new strategic concepts which recognized the
Soviet Union as the enemy and corresponded to a foreign policy
of containment and retaliation.
Congress and the public in the "twenties" were in-
different to developments outside the United States which
might effect the defense of this country. They were definitely
hostile to the idea of increased taxation and expenditures for
the military. After World War II the United States was forced
to focus its attention on foreign affairs and the feeling grew
that events in other parts of the world were of direct impor-
tance to the over-all security of the United States. The
public was conditioned to think in terms of a large defense
structure thus money was generally available for experimenta-
tion and development in a number of varied fields.
In Forrestal the Navy had a civilian leader who was
aware of the needs of the service and who continuously worked
for and supported expansion of the Navy. He vocally and
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effectively promoted the welfare of the Navy in the government.
The Army in the 1920' s did not have a civilian Secretary of
War equal in stature or ability to Forrestal.
In general terms, the Army in the "twenties" was dor-
mant, it had even regressed since the war. The Navy in the
late "forties" was in a period of transition. It was moving
ahead, not in any specific direction or toward a clearly
defined goal, but because it realized that its traditional
concepts were no longer valid.
CHAPTER III
METHODS EMPLOYED BY EACH IN HIS ATTEMPT TO
ESTABLISH HIS CONCEPTION OR INNOVATION
Mitchell and the Frontal Assault
Mitchell, as has been noted, returned from the war
convinced that the airplane would be one of the decisive
weapons in any future war and that as such it should he given
a prominent place in the post-war defense structure. He was
somewhat dismayed when he did not get the top position in the
Air Service after his wartime chief, Major General Mason
Patrick, left the Air Service to return to the Engineers.
Instead, Major General Charles Menoher, an Infantry officer,
was appointed to head the Air Service. Mitchell's quarrel
with Foulois during the war which had caused resentment
against him on the part of some air officers was, no doubt,
one reason he failed to get the job. Menoher though quickly
reverted to nominal head as he recognized Mitchell's superi-
ority in aeronautics and let him dominate the service as head
of the Training and Operations Group.
By the middle of 1919 Mitchell began his fight both
for an expanded air arm, which he felt was needed for the
hurley, Billy Mitchell
. 41.
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military strength of the country, and also for his personal
ambition of becoming head of an independent organization for
aeronautics. This was probably the primary reason he stayed
in the Army in the 1920' s even though the low pay forced him
to turn to his family again for additional financial support.
Thus, Mitchell's goal in 1919 was to convince his superiors
in the Army and in the government that the airplane had added
a new dimension to warfare which could be best exploited in
an independent military aeronautical organization. He urged
the establishment of a Department of Aeronautics to control
both civilian and military aviation. In the military sphere
this department was to be equal in rank and authority to the
War and Navy Departments. It was to control all military air-
craft, detailing units to the other two services as they
expressed their needs. It was also to maintain a force for
independent operations, not necessarily in conjunction with
the other services. The rationale for combining civilian
aviation with military was that it would insure its steady
and quick growth as each would complement the other. Also,
it would be much easier to mobilize civil aviation for war in
p
this organizational arrangement.
From 1919 until the passage of the National Defense
Act in 1920 Mitchell's efforts to gain the acceptance of his
ideas were largely exerted within the existing framework and
channels for change available to him in the Army. When he
2Hurley, Billy Mitchell . 45.
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failed to achieve satisfactory results with these he attempted,
through public pressure, to force an expanded air policy on
the Army and get an independent air organization.
Opposition to an air arm independent of the Army and
the Navy came, in 1919 and 1920, from high quarters in both
services. General Pershing, General John Harbord, Pershing's
wartime chief of staff, and General J. L. Hines acting chief
of staff of the Army in 1919. made known their opposition to
a unified Air Service. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker was
opposed to Mitchell's proposals as was Major General Patrick
who went so far as to write to General Pershing of what he
thought were Mitchell's personal ambitions in pursuing a
separate air arm. The basic reason for their objection was .
expressed in the Dickman Board which met in April, 1919» to
consider the lessons learned from World War I and how these
should affect post-war tactics and organization. This board
concluded that airpower should be given an independent organi-
zation only when it had the capability for decisive action by
itself, as the Army and the Navy.^ Since airpower had shown
no such ability in the last war these leaders naturally con-
cluded that a separate air arm would only violate the prin-
ciple of "unity of command.
"
Before the Army Reorganization Act, which emerged as
the National Defense Act, became law in 1920, Mitchell testi-
fied for several Congressional Committees investigating the
-"O'Connor, American Defense Policy
. 206.
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feasibility and desirability of a separate Department of
Aeronautics. While be, of course, supported tbe establishment
of such a department be did not at this time attack or ques-
tion tbe motives of those in opposition to an independent Air
Service. He probably felt that he could convince Congress of
the need of such an organization by selling it his advanced
theories of airpower so obvious to him that he thought every-
one else would readily grasp them. Even though his tone was
very moderate as compared with his later appearances, his
testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in
August, 1919, and the House Committee on aviation in December,
1919, aroused the antipathy of ninny other officers in both
the Army and the Navy. After Mitchell testified on Naval
Aviation he was indirectly rebuked by Newton D. Baker who
ordered Army officers not to make statements "with reference
to other co-ordinate executive departments which may reason-
ably be questioned or which will serve to discredit or to
4
reflect upon the work of these departments."
The National Defense Act of 1920 kept the Air Service
within the Army. Mitchell now felt that he could not con-
vince his military colleagues or his civilian superiors in
the War Department of the importance of the air arm and of its
need for an independent organization to fully exploit all of
its latent capabilities. He had several courses of action
4
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open to aim. He could end all attempts to bring about an
Independent Air Service. He could perform well within the
limits of his job and attempt to reach a high enough position
in the Army from which he could force his views on others.
Or, he could become a "rebel" within the service by seeking
help from outside in putting through his reforms.''
Mitchell's personality ruled out the first alternative.
He was too deeply committed and convinced of his views to just
drop them. He was ambitious in wanting to become the head of
a new independent Air Service. He had been in the center of
the stage throughout his military career and he could not take
a back seat in the Air Service or have it relegated to a
supporting role in the Army.
The second alternative was too much of a gamble for
Mitchell. At least the odds were not as favorable as they
were for the third alternative. It was very doubtful that
Mitchell would have ever reached a commanding position in the
Army so that he could force his views on it from the top. His
peacetime rank was Colonel, and promotions to General would
probably be very slow in the small Army. It is very likely
that Mitchell thought he would never reach General rank be-
cause he was in a relatively new branch while all of the older
officers who sat on the promotion boards were from the more
established branches of the service to which they were loyal
and which they viewed more important. Had he somehow attained
5Ibid.
, 562.
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the rank of a General officer he still would not have become
Chief of Staff because he was from the Air Service.
This left Mitchell with the third alternative of be-
coming a military "rebel," forcing a change on the military
through external pressures. These pressures were to come
from the American public and Congress. Mitchell fully under-
stood the dangers involved in this course of action and that
if he failed, his career would be ended. But he felt he had
a better than average chance for success. The airplane was
the weapon of the future. He was convinced of this and he
felt that he could and would prove this. Once this was shown
the Army would be forced into an expanded air policy through
pressure from Congress and the public and gradually this would
evolve into an independent Air Service. His role as the
apostle of airpower would make him the only logical choice,
acceptably to Congress and the public, as military head of
the new service. If he were out of the Army when this happened
he would get the top civilian position in a Department of
Aeronautics. So, Mitchell consciously set out to enlist the
American public and Congress on his side. He became a
publicist and a crusader for airpower, convinced that he could
force a change in the Army "through the pressure of public
opinion." Mitchell failed to notice the fate of the last
crusader who had taken his campaign to the public, Woodrow
Wilson.
6Levine, Mitchell
. 31?.
50
The first step in Mitchell's fight was to prove that
the airplane was indeed a decisive new weapon. Be shrewdly
began emphasizing the defensive capabilities of the airplane
thus bringing it in line with the isolationist sentiments.
He stated that the airplane had made the battleship obsolete
and needlessly expensive for defensive purposes because it
could defend the country's coasts better and far cheaper.
He took pains to dwell on the monetary aspects, emphasizing
7the differences in costs between battleships and airplanes.
Gradually Mitchell's challenge to the Navy began to
be felt as various newspapers began to call for tests of his
theories. The Navy conducted tests of its own in October
and November of 1920. Navy pilots dropped bombs from air-
planes on the battleship Indiana , a relic from the Spanish-
American Jar. In the published report of the tests the Navy
concluded that bombs from airplanes could not put a battleship
q
out of action. Still Mitchell kept up his verbal attacks
against the battleship and forced the Navy to concede to
bombing tests carried out by the Air Service against ships.
Congress voted its approval for the tests and provided money.
These were carried out in June and July, 1921, against ships
7Hurley, Billy Mitchell . 60.
Q
New York Times . January 31, 1921, 8.
9Davis, Mitchell Affair
. 68-69.
Roger Burlingame, General "Billy" Mitchell :
Champion of Air Defense (New York: The New American Library,
19%5, 87.
51
stationed off the Virginia capes which included the German
super-dreadnaught Ostfriesland . The climax of these tests
came when Mitchell's bombers attacked the "unsinkable"
Ostfriesland on July 22, 1921. Newly acquired 2,000 lb.
bombs by the Air Service quickly sank the ship to the amaze-
ment of all present. The Navy rightly claimed afterward that
Mitchell had violated the rules set down before the test and
that he should have stopped bombing the Ostfriesland to let
Navy inspectors board her and assess the damage after she had
been injured by the bombs. But Mitchell's plan was to sink
the ship as quickly and spectacularly as possible. Some of
Mitchell's most avid supporters had not expected him to sink
the Ostfriesland so quickly and even the staunchest battleship
supporter admitted that the airplane had added a new element
to naval warfare although they declined to speculate exactly
as to what its effect would be.
Mitchell hoped to reap a revolution from these tests.
So, he was disappointed when the report on the bombing tests
by the Joint Army and Navy Board stated simply that the impor-
tance of air warfare to both the Army and Navy had been shown,
but that the tests did not make the battleship obsolete. This
report went on to state that "the development of aircraft,
instead of furnishing an economical instrument of war leading
to the abolition of the battleship, has but added to the
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complexity of naval warfare."12 In its conclusion the report
seemed heartening to many air enthusiasts by stating "the
experiments conducted have proved that it has become impera-
tive as a matter of national defense to provide for the maxi-
mum possible development of aviation in both the Army and
the Navy."13
Still Mitchell wanted more. He was disappointed by
the comment made by his superior in the Air Service, Major
General Menoher, that he did not think the tests doomed the
battleship. 14 In late September, 1921, he began to attack
publicly the board findings, stating "the problem of destruc-
tion of seacraft by airplanes is finished. It has been
solved. "^ Then he claimed "the First Provisional Air Brigade
could have put out of action the entire Atlantic fleet in one
attack."16 He again showed what his goal was by suggesting
"the scheme of national defense should be revised at once on
the following basis: A Department of National Defense, with
17
sub-secretaries for Army, Navy, and Air." '
Mitchell's publicity campaign brought about a crisis
12
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within the Air Service in September, 1921. Menoher was begin-
ning to resent the almost constant publicity which Mitchell
was getting. This may help to explain Menoher' s somewhat
reserved position on the results of the tests.
In June, before the bombing tests began, Menoher had
recommended the removal of Mitchell as Assistant Chief of the
Air Service to the new Secretary of War in the Harding cabinet,
John W. Weeks. 18 Mitchell did not lose his Job at this time
because Weeks was new and probably was not fully acquainted
with the situation and Just before the tests it would have
seemed that the Army was trying to shut Mitchell up before he
TO
had a chance to prove his case. y The breaking point in the
conflict between Menoher and Mitchell came when Mitchell went
on another publicity stunt shortly after the completion of
the bombing tests. On his orders Air Service bombers carried
out war game air raids on several cities, after which Mitchell
stated to the press that these cities were vulnerable to air
attacks without an adequate air defense which in turn meant
protection by the Air Service. Menoher demanded the removal
20
of Mitchell or that he, himself, be removed. Menoher lost
his job, but Mitchell was not promoted to it. Instead, Major
General Patrick, wartime head of the Air Service, was called
18New York Times . June 10, 1921, 2.
19Hurley, Billy Mitchell . 6?.
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to take Kenoher's place. Patrick, as was noted, had written
to Pershing earlier concerning what he thought were Mitchell's
personal ambitions in pursuing an independent Air Service.
By late 1921, in view of what he had hoped to accom-
plish, Mitchell had gotten very little. Menoher had been
removed, but Patrick kept a much tighter reign over Mitchell
and made it clear that he was head of the Air Service in fact
as well as in name. The dispute with Menoher and his pub-
licity campaign had only served to make him more enemies with-
in the Air Service and the Army. While the leaders in the
Army were finding their appropriations getting smaller and
were attempting to meet this external threat to their exist-
ence, they were beginning to see in Mitchell an internal
threat because he was demanding larger shares of the relatively
small amount of money available to the other branches of the
Army. This did not help his already tarnished reputation.
Once Mitchell made the headlines, he also became trapped by
them. His actions had aroused sufficient opposition against
him in high echelons of the Army, Navy, and the government,
that he could not advance his career and his personal ambitions
by normal means. His only hope of advancing himself and an
independent Air Service was to continue the publicity campaign
so that public pressure would eventually force a change on the
Army and the government.
For the next two years though, Patrick kept Mitchell
out of the spotlight as much as possible. He sent Mitchell
on inspection tours to £urope and the Pacific. When he was in
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the country he was kept busy inspecting air bases. But,
instead of solving the Army's "Mitchell problem," Patrick's
efforts only postponed it for a time, and when Mitchell began
his publicity campaign again in the fall of 1924, he was much
harsher and also better prepared. In talking with foreign
airmen and noting the progress of aeronautics in Europe he
became even more convinced that airpower would be the key in
any future war, while his inspection trips in the United States
emphasized to him the pitiful state of American aeronautics.
Mitchell was by no means the only person in the Air
Service working for its improvements at this time. While he
was out of the capital, Patrick was moving along more normal
channels within the government to get support for an expanded
air policy. As a result of his efforts the Lassiter Board,
headed by Major General William Lassiter, was convened in
Washington, 3. C, in March, 1923, to determine the proper
strength and organization of the Air Service both in material
and personnel. This board concluded that the condition of the
Air Service was critical. It stated that private air indus-
try was not developed enough, that equipment was predomin-
ately old, and that appropriations for new airplanes were too
small. In the end it recommended that the Air Service be
21increased to three times its present strength. Earlier in
the same year, General Patrick, in his annual report on the
21
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Army Air Service, had also stressed "the inadequacy of appro-
priations", and the "rapid deterioration of war produced
22
equipment."
In a report entitled "Industrial Mobilization and
Aviation" the Assistant Secretary of War, Mayhew Walnwright,
stated that "our most notable deficiency at the present time
is in the matter of aircraft . . . the situation in the Army
23
Air Service is most critical." ' No concrete progress was
however obtained by any of these efforts. But these efforts
do show that the Army and the War Department recognized the
need for improving the condition of the Air Service. Mitchell
was not opposed so much because of his ideas, but because of
the methods he used in attempting to get reform.
The Lassiter Board had recommended the preparation of
legislation for introduction in Congress to keep steps with
the evolution in aviation and to end the alarming and critical
condition of the Air Service. Nothing became of this and other
attempts to get more funds for the Air Service because Congress
would not raise military appropriations.
Mitchell returned to Washington from a tour in the
Far East in July, 1924. The Lassiter program had failed and
Mitchell's tour in the Pacific had convinced him that war with
Japan was coming and that the best way to be prepared for this
"Annual Army Air Service Report," Aviation , XIV,
(January 8, 1923). 42-43.
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was to have a strong air force. While he had been out of the
lead for a time in the fight for more airpower, his goals for
himself and for the Air Service had not changed. The second
publicity campaign that he now began ended in his court-
martial one year later.
He violated an order from Secretary of War, Weeks,
that he submit all articles he intended to publish to the War
Department for clearance. Without doing this he had five
articles published in the Saturday Evening Post between
December, 1924, and March, 1925- In these he severely criti-
cised and even attacked the integrity of all those who dis-
agreed with him. He went so far as to accuse the Navy of
letting water into the Ostfriesland to keep her from rolling
over under the impact of the light bombs that his planes
dropped. He went further and brought these changes into
Congress, gradually attacking the Navy and War Department as
joint plotters in keeping the Air Service down.
There were two sets of Congressional hearings in the
House at this time. Mitchell appeared before both. The
Lampert Committee, was investigating contracts, settlements,
and audits of the Army and Navy Air Services and the other was
concerned with the Curry Bill, introduced into the House by
Hepresentative John f. Curry, to bring about a unified Air
Service. Mitchell definitely wanted to bring the whole air
policy issue before the public again. He probably felt that
this would be his last chance to act in the official capacity
of Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service. His term expired
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on March 26, 1925, and it seemed unlikely that he would be
reappointed. This would mean that he would revert to his
permanent rank of Colonel. If, however, he could get a change
in the Air Service before his appointment was up, he might be
able to keep his position and even be in line for a higher
position. If he failed he could retire in 1928, with thirty
years service to his credit, after which his publicity would
serve him in good stead as the prime candidate for the top
position in a Department of Aeronautics which he felt would
eventually be established.
3o, Mitchell gradually broadened his attack to gain
publicity, public support, and Congressional support. He
created a sensation in testifying for the Curry Bill on
January 31, 1925, that it was impossible for the committee to
obtain correct information on aviation from the services be-
cause officers testifying were afraid of indirect disciplinary
24-
actions from their departments . Secretary of War, Weeks,
immediately asked Mitchell to explain the testimony he had
given. He publicly stated that this action on the part of
the War Department was not unusual and that many times offi-
cers were called upon to clarify or substantiate their publicly
expressed views, especially in cases where they may be chal-
25lenged by other departments of the government. * This may
have been the last chance for Mitchell to save himself from a
24New York Times . February 1, 1925, 27.
2^New York Times . February 4, 1925, 1.
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strong reaction by the Army. He chose instead to widen his
attack. In testimony on February 6, he answered Weeks. He
made no attempt to prove his assertion that officers were
afraid to speak before Congress; instead, he launched into a
severe attack against both the War and Navy Departments. He
censured unsparingly what he characterized as "the system"
now in operation in those departments, saying that aviation
had consciously been denied the place commensurate with its
26
military importance and its prospective future. He accused
the War Department of limiting the ability and effect of
aviation in a military way, saying it had done little to de-
velop aviation commercially which was necessary in a well
27balanced governmental organization. ' Then he charged deliber-
ate falsification of other Army testimony given before the
committee on the number of serviceable airplanes. "I believe,"
he said, "that there has been woeful ignorance and in some
cases plain distortion of facts by some of the witnesses before
28
this committee, tending to confuse the country and Congress."
It is interesting to note that Mitchell was very consciously
trying to disassociate himself from the Army at this time.
He gave this testimony in a civilian suit while all the other
29
Army officers present wore their uniforms. '
26New York Times , February 7. 1925, 1.
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The confrontation was now clearly set, it was Mitchell
against his superiors in the Army and in the War and Navy
Departments. He was swinging as hard as he could. He occu-
pied the center of the publicity stage. Newspapers were
selling many extra copies by carrying Mitchell's testimony on
the front pages. It was as much of a public spectacle as any
major prize-fight. But this was the problem for Mitchell and
one that he evidently did not understand. The public kept its
interest in the case because of its spectacular nature. They
were cheering for him because he was the "underdog", a David
fighting a Goliath. The public was far less concerned about
the real issues involved, it was mainly enjoying a good fight.
The Navy now entered the fray against Mitchell.
Captain A. V. Johnson, Assistant Chief of the Navy's Bureau
of Aeronautics, testified before the House and accused Mitchell
of disobeying orders and rules in the 1921 battleship tests,
and held to the opinion that there was no need for a unified
Air .Service. He acidly commented that "England, Japan, and
General Mitchell and his advocates are the only ones who want
to limit our battleships. "y Mitchell had not only roused
the Navy and War Departments into assailing him, some members
of Congress were now openly against him. Representative
Butler of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs
Committee, said he had never heard of a Secretary of the Navy
who tried to hamper the expression of opinions by naval
5°New York Times
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officers before a Congressional committee. Representative
Britten, also a member of that committee, called Mitchell "an
31
energetic dreamer. "' The Army and the War department began
building their case against Mitchell. Secretary Weeks testi-
fied that Mitchell violated instructions from the War Depart-
ment and from President Coolidge when he failed to submit the
Saturday Evening; Post articles to the War Department for
32
approval.
When Mitchell's reappointment as Assistant Chief of
the Air Service came up, which also carried with it the tempo-
rary rank of Brigadier General, Weeks failed to recommend him
to continue serving in that position. In a letter to President
Coolidge, Weeks explained that "Mitchell's whole course has
been so lawless, so contrary to the building up of an efficient
organization, so lacking in reasonable teamwork, so indicative
of a personal desire for publicity at the expense of everyone
with whom he is associated that his actions render him unfit
for a high administrative position such as he now occupies. ***
President Coolidge appointed Lt. Colonel James E. Pechet to
the position and Mitchell reverted to his rank of Colonel and
was transferred to Port Sam Houston, Texas, to become Air
Officer of the Eight Corps.
*
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At this time there were speculations that the Army
would bring charges against Mitchell, but these never came
probably because the War Department wanted to get the whole
case out of the public spotlight. Mitchell knew he was
finished in the Army, he had lost the second round in his
attempt to get public and Congressional support for his ideas,
but this did not prevent him from trying again. In fact,
short of giving up his ambitions, this was the only course of
action left to him.
On August 28, 1925, it was announced that Mitchell's
Winged Defense was to be published in September. Through it
he once more attacked the policies of the War and Navy Depart-
ments. " Again he did not submit the manuscript for approval
to the War Department, and the feeling was that upon its
release he would be faced with a court-martial. Before the
Army could act on the book however, a series of events took
place which left it no alternative but to press charges
against him.
The Navy, in a publicity drive, had scheduled the
longest flight over water. Three planes were to cover the
distance from San Francisco to Hawaii. Only two planes left
San Francisco. One of these two came down at sea with engine
trouble while the remaining one, after having covered four-
fifths of the journey, was lost. On top of this, the Navy
dirigible Shenandoah , making a good will trip through the
^New York Times . August 29, 1925, 6.
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mid-west to give those people a glimpse of the Navy, was caught
in a violent electric storm over Ohio and destroyed, killing
its captain and thirteen members of the crew. There were
big headlines throughout the country, and Mitchell had a
ready-made platform again.
In a prepared statement of seventeen typewritten pages
he lashed into the War and Navy Departments again on September
5, 1921. He stated that the Navy's loss of the plane and of
the Shenandoah "are the direct result of incompetency, crim-
inal negligence, and almost treasonable administration by the
War and Navy Departments." "As far as aviation is concerned,
the conduct of these departments has been so disgusting in the
last few years as to make any self-respecting person ashamed
of the clothes he wears. Were it not for the great patriotism
of our air officers and their hope for a change in conditions
sooner or later, I doubt if a real man would remain with the
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colors under existing conditions. ""
Mitchell undoubtedly had decided that he would force
the Army to court-martial him thus making him a martyr in the
view of the public. That he expected action to be taken
against him is shown in an interview after issuing his state-
ment where he said he expected the War Department to order his
arrest. He again made a crude attempt to drive a wedge
36Burlingame, General "Billy" Mitchell . 114-115.
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between the War and Navy Departments on one side and Congress
on the other, and to enlist Congressional support on his side
by stating:
The great Congress of the United States, that makes
laws Tor the organization and use of our air, land,
and water forces, is treated by these two departments
as if it were an organization created for their benefit,
to which evidence of any kind, whether true or not, can
be given without restraint. Officers and agents sent
by the War and Navy Departments to Congress have almost
always given incomplete, misleading, or false information
about aeronautics, which either they knew to be false
when given or was the result of such gross ignorance of
the question that they should not be allowed to appear
before a legislative body. 39
The reaction of the War Department was quick. The new
Secretary of War, Dwight F. Davis, told the Associated Press
that it "wouldn't do to get in a public discussion with a
subordinate . . . actions and not words" were needed to deal
with the situation. Mitchell's outburst only served to
dramatize his complete alienation from the Army. Many per-
sons who had heretofore supported Mitchell, or generally
agreed with many of his ideas, now left his side. He was
clearly marked as a radical and few persons, especially in
the service, wanted any connection with him.
President Coolidge now moved behind the scenes to deal
with Mitchell, whom he had tolerated during his previous
statements, but he was no longer willing to take more of the
bad publicity his administration had been burdened with from
the case. Ue appointed Dwight Morrow, a friend of his and
^New York Times
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senior partner in the J. P. Morgan bank, to head an inquiry
into the Air Service and the general situation of American
aviation. The persons chosen for the board were all well
respected and well known. Mitchell himself conceded that it
41
would be a "painstaking and fair investigation. " This was
an adroit move by Coolidge to take some of the steam away from
Mitchell. The very existence of the board seemed to show that
the administration was concerned about aeronautics. Now
Mitchell's charges could be weighed against the findings of
the board.
In the meantime the Army had also moved against
Mitchell. On September 8, Major General Hines, Chief of Staff
of the Army ordered the Inspector General to make a complete
investigation surrounding the issues of Mitchell's statements
at San Antonio, while he was temporarily relieved of his
duties. On October 20, the War Department announced its de-
cision to begin court-martial proceedings against Mitchell on
October 28, under the 96th article of war which stipulated
that:
. . . all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and military discipline, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the military service
shall be taken cognizance of by a court-martial and
punished at the discretion of such court . . .*2
The date of Mitchell's court-martial coincided with
the announced beginning of hearings before the Morrow Board.
41
•*-New York Times . September 11, 1925, 1.
42
«ew York Times . October 21, 1925, 1.
66
Thus Mitchell's court-martial would be in competition for
publicity with the actions of, and testimony before the board.
Mitchell chose Frank Heid to defend him. Held was a
Congressman from Illinois who was one of his declared sup-
porters in the House and who was acquainted with airplanes
and aeronautics. What worried Mitchell though was that he
felt a court-martial under the 96th article would not permit
him to espouse publicly his views again, and the only testi-
mony allowed would be, in his words, whether he "called the
War Department and the Navy Department into disrepute." '
Before his trial began, Mitchell was allowed to testify before
the Morrow Board. The War Department did not want to make it
look like it was trying to shut him up.
On October 28, the court-martial began and the atten-
tion of most of the country was focused on it, with few
doubting the final verdict under the 96th article. The cru-
cial stage, for Mitchell, came when the defense asked to be
allowed to prove the charges that had been made by Mitchell.
The court acceeded to the request even though the issue had
been made clear as one of breach of discipline. It now seemed
again that Mitchell was on trial for his ideas as he was
allowed to present his views and to summon more than seventy
witnesses who agreed with him. The question remains as to why
the court-martial let the case be thrown open to a debate of
the air issues. Possibly the officers on the board felt that
4^New rork Times
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he would not be able to substantiate his charges, or that it
was a matter of fair play to a fellow officer with whom they
were all acquainted. The most logical answer though is that
it was a shrewdly calculated move to settle the issue within
the boundaries of the Army. If Mitchell had been silenced
and routinely tried on the discipline issue, a Congressional
investigation might well have taken up his charges. But with
him being able to voice his views it showed that the Army was
willing to listen to the air issue, and his inevitable guilty
charge would have made it seem that the officers on the court-
martial board had objectively weighed his views and disagreed
with them.
Another point in the Army's favor was the report of
the Morrow Board which came out two weeks before Mitchell's
trial was over. Its conclusion, very comforting to the Army,
was that:
We do not consider that air power, as an arm of the
national defense, has yet demonstrated its value. We
believe that such independent missions as it is capable
of can be better carried out under the high command of
the Army or Navy as the case may be.^
The court-martial closed on December 17, finding
Mitchell guilty and sentencing him to a suspension from rank
and forfeiture of pay and allowances for five years. * It was
obvious that Mitchell could not remain in the Army under these
circumstances and he resigned. There were some rumblings in
^Burlingame, General "Billy" Mitchell , 124.
^New York Times . December 18, 1925, 1.
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the House in support of Mitchell, but the steps introduced to
aid him stood little chance of success. The most ludicrous
attempt came from Representative Thomas L. Blanton of Texas
who proposed by Joint resolution the abolition of all court-
martial trials in both the Army and Navy in time of peace, and
the restoration of Colonel Mitchell to the rank of Brigadier
General. His resolution also called for the suspension from
the Army for five years of the Assistant and Acting Chiefs of
Staff, and of Generals Grave and King, members of the court-
martial that declared Mitchell guilty.w
After the court-martial Mitchell did not rest. He
wrote a lot and went on a stumping tour across the country.
His audience though diminished fast. Once the spectacular
aspects surrounding his case were gone, most of his listeners
deserted him. People were not interested in hearing about the
next war and the changes that should be made in the defense
establishment. Mitchell's last hope for a change in policy
was with the democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt
in 1932. He had some hopes that a separate Department of
Aeronautics might be established in which he would get the top
civilian position. This never came about, and Mitchell died
in 1936, having failed to build an Air Force that would be his
monument, but indirectly having advanced the cause of aero-
nautics in this country.
46Hew York Times. December 19, 1925, 1.
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Rickover and the Indirect Approach
The Monsanto project at Oak Ridge, to which Hickover
had been sent by the Navy as one of its representatives, was
the first major effort toward developing a practical use for
atomic power. It was designed to he a cooperative effort
between the armed services, industry, and the government in
building a nuclear reactor. The Navy was interested in the
project because, at some time in the future, atomic power might
be used to propel ships. It was conceded by almost everyone
in the Navy that this would not occur for some time and that
therefore there was no sense of urgency surrounding the
47project. '
Before reporting to Oak Ridge, Rickover went through
the secret files of the Bureau of Ships in Washington looking
for any material that might help him prepare for his assign-
ment. He read a report submitted by a Dr. Philip Abelson,
who had worked for the Naval Research Laboratory and had
visited some Manhattan District projects, on the possible uses
of atomic power for submarines. It was a detailed paper and
included a description of a nuclear power plant, a coolant for
the reactor, and other important and enlightening details. It
is impossible to point to an exact time when the idea of work-
ing to build an atomic submarine developed in Rickover' s mind,
but this undoubtedly made a lasting impression on Rickover.
He already had a practical knowledge of submarining as a result
tin
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of two years service on 3-48 . Also, he had translated from
the German, in 1936, Hermann Bauer's The Submarine, Its
Importance as a Fart of a Fleet, Its Employment in War, Its
Future, which, no doubt broadened his understanding of the
strategic uses of submarines. The advantages a "true" sub-
marine would have over other ships because it could remain
submerged indefinitely as atomic power required no oxygen,
were self evident. Probably a combination of the above fac-
tors with some others made Rickover decide that the first use
for atomic power in the Navy should be in a submarine.
He was the first member of the Navy team to arrive at
Oak Ridge and he managed to secure an appointment as Assistant
to the Director of Operations. From this position he was
able to gain a quick understanding of the administrative struc-
ture and the work being carried on, which gave him an impor-
tant head-start over the officers yet to arrive.
When these officers finally appeared Rickover was
shocked to find out that they had not been assigned to his
command but just to study with him in a loose group of equals.
The Navy's purpose in sending officers to the Monsanto project
was to have them become familiar with the building of a
nuclear reactor so they could use this knowledge in helping to
build an atomic power plant for a ship. But, Rickover had
already taken a step beyond that. He had his mind set that
he was going to take the lead in providing the Navy with
nuclear power and that this was to be in a submarine. He
realized that only a concentrated effort in the same direction
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on the part of the entire group would assure the earliest
attainment of this goal. To get this he had to do two things.
He had to get these men to recognize his authority so that he
could direct their studies, and he had to convince them that
the study should be toward a reactor for a submarine.
He called the officers together one day and let them
know that as senior naval officer at Oak Ridge he would assume
the task of filling out their fitness reports. That was enough
to transform the loose study group into a team controlled by
Rickover who now directed their study into specified areas.
These officers soon came to realize the potentials of an
atomic-powered submarine and began to believe in it as much
4-8
as Hickover did.
But, as soon as Rickover had established his authority
over this group, he was faced by another and more serious
challenge to his authority and to his goal. Instead of being
directly under the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the senior
officer immediately concerned with nuclear power as he thought,
he found that the Navy had given him a new boss. A Captain
Albert G. Mumma had been made head of nuclear power work in
the Bureau of Ships, while a Captain Harry Burris had been
sent to General Electric to begin preliminary planning with
them for a ship's nuclear reactor. Rickover had thought that
after the Monsanto project was completed, he and his group
would supervise the construction of a nuclear engine plant.
tlQ
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But now, Captain Burris was already doing this with G. E.
Even more disturbing, G. E.'s plans called for a reactor to
fit into a destroyer. To further complicate the problem,
Captain Mumma told Rickover that all reports by the Naval
Group at Oak Hidge had to be sent through his office. *
Rickover shrewdly managed to counter this by stating that he
was working for the Army, since the Manhattan District was a
branch of the Army, and that Mumma would have to get permission
from the Army to see those reports, whereupon Mumma dropped
the subject. The officers working with Rickover remained
loyal to him at this time because he had succeeded in instill-
ing in them the desire to build an atomic reactor for a sub-
marine and also because he still filled out their fitness
reports.
The next problem Rickover faced was the slowing down
of the Monsanto project. This was partly a result of the
organizational change which was in progress in the control of
atomic energy. During the war and immediately following it,
the Army had been in control of all atomic research. In 19*7
however, this was taken from the Army and all matters relating
to atomic energy were put into the hands of a new civilian
agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. As this change was in
'Blair, Atomic Submarine
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progress, work slowed at Oak Ridge because of an uncertainty
as to how the change would affect the reactor project. It
also slowed because, Hickover felt, not enough attention was
being paid to the engineering problems of a reactor and that
too much time was being devoted to the theoretical-scientific
52
aspects of it.
The organizational change which was taking place did
help Hickover indirectly. The new Atomic Knergy Commission
wanted a statement from the Navy as to its aims in atomic
propulsion for ships and asked Hickover, since he was the
senior officer of the Navy team at Oak Hidge. Hickover took
this opportunity to express his views on atomic power for the
Navy. He predicted that the Navy would have a nuclear powered
ship in five to eight years and that in ten to fifteen years
53
it would have nuclear powered ships of every variety. ** This
report was forwarded to the Bureau of Ships and, while Captain
Mumma and Admiral Mills were startled by these predictions,
they let them stand. This was due to their relatively small
knowledge of atomic power which points out one of the major
differences between Mitchell's and Rickover's campaigns, to
the advantage of Rickover. Uhile Mitchell was one of many
persons in the field of aeronautics, Hickover was one of a
very select few in the field of atomic energy. Because of the
secrecy surrounding all projects concerned in any way with
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atomic energy very few persons even knew that such work, as
Hickover's, was going on. While only a handful of experts
could disagree with Hickover on the technical aspects of the
atomic submarine, many "experts" could voice opinions contra-
dictory to Mitchell's.
With work slowed on the reactor project at Oak Ridge,
Hickover decided to go to ochenectady, JSew York, where Captain
Burris and General Electric were working on plans for a naval
reactor. The work there was only slightly better than that of
the Monsanto project. At least G. E. was further along on the
application of a power reactor for a destroyer than Oak Ridge
was with its power reactor. But again, Rickover felt that the
engineering aspects of the reactor were being ignored by the
scientists, as at Oak Ridge. Moreover, General Electric had
become interested in the idea of a breeder reactor that would
produce fissionable material as it was operating. They began
M
to put most of their efforts into research in this direction.
Rickover then set out trying to convince Captain Burris and
General Electric that they should build a smaller reactor than
the one they had planned for a destroyer, concentrating in-
stead on one that would fit into a destroyer escort or possibly
a submarine. The most convincing argument which he used, and
the one which caused the change to a smaller reactor, was that
fissionable material was scarce and a reactor of the size they
y Blair, Atomic Submarine . 84.
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were planning would consume too much. ?
Thus again, Rickover, on his own initiative caused a
change at General Electric without the knowledge or permission
of his superiors and he indirectly enlisted General Electric
in the work toward an atomic submarine. The lack of anyone
other than Rickover to supervise atomic work allowed him to
establish his concepts without any visible opposition. The
importance of this factor in his eventual success cannot be
overstressed.
Next came a series of events that nearly doomed Rick-
over's plans. The only thing that saved him and the atomic
submarine was his dogged determination to carry out the pro-
ject. The Naval Group at Oak Ridge was disbanded and assigned
to other duties while Rickover was given a meaningless posi-
tion and title as "Special Assistant" for Nuclear Matters and
transferred to Washington. At the same time the Monsanto
project had further deteriorated as Dr. Parrington Daniels,
head of the project, left it. The news from General Electric
was equally discouraging. It had decided to push the breeder
reactor at the expense of other projects. The Navy was not
really concerned because it did not have the sense of urgency
or immediacy for the reactor project as Hickover did. Rick-
over understood the problem of lead-time—the time which
elapses between conception of a new idea, its development, and
^Blair, Atomic Submarine . 84.
56Ibid., 87.
76
finally its fruition in the completed new article rolling
from the production lines—which was either not recognized or
57
fully understood by the Navy at that time. '
By mid-194-7, Rickover was in much the same position
as Mitchell was in 1920, when the National Defense Act kept
the Air Service within the Army in a position secondary to
ground forces. Rickover had to map a new strategy for the
attainment of his goal. The fresh plans he developed called
for convincing his superiors in the Navy, the government, and
in the Atomic iinergy Commission of the necessity for building
an atomic ship as soon as possible. It is interesting to note
that he did not attempt to dramatize his case for an atomic
submarine in public. One reason for this was the secrecy of
the project. But it is doubtful whether Rickover ever con-
sidered this as one of his options for bringing about a
nuclear powered ship. He undoubtedly considered this as a
purely service problem which would have to be solved within
the Navy. Rickover did have one plus factor on his side when
he began his fight to convince his superiors of the need of
a nuclear ship, and that was that he enjoyed the complete
confidence and support of his superior in the Bureau of Ships,
Admiral Wills. Rickover also conceived an ingenious plan.
He knew most of the men who were working on the Monsanto
project. And, although it was stalled, he thought he might be
''Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, "Lead Time and
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able to convince these men to put their lagging efforts into
working toward a naval submarine reactor. He went to Oak
Ridge and got these men to channel the money remaining in the
project to a naval reactor." Again, this is illustrative of
the knack Rickover had for doing what probably no one else
would even have thought of attempting. ..hen normal channels
were blocked he refused to be stopped; instead, he searched
until other avenues were opened to his goals. Another impor-
tant point that bears mentioning is that Rickover was able
to describe to these scientists in detail what they should be
working toward and the type of reactor he felt the Navy
needed. Thus Rickover was not only an administrative "genius,"
but he was also thoroughly grounded in the field of atomic
energy so that he knew in detail what the end product of a
Navy reactor for a submarine should be like. He was able to
explain the special problems that would need consideration in
putting a reactor in a submarine, and the many safety features
which would have to be included.
Only a few persons ever realized that what had begun
at Oak Ridge as a project to build an industrial reactor had
now been turned, by Rickover, into a Navy project. Admiral
Mills learned of the switch but did not say anything because
he liked Rickover and because this was actually a boon to the
Navy to get, in effect, free research.
Now Rickover set out on a definite course to get his
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superiors to endorse the idea of an atomic submarine. One of
his major goals along the way was to get the Secretary of the
Navy to declare publicly that an atomic submarine was both
desirable and necessary for the Navy. To do this he had to
get the Chief of Naval Operations to endorse the idea. It
can be seen that Rickover was attempting to stay within the
proper channels of command which prevented unnecessary anger-
ing of anyone by attempting to bypass their authority in a
direct appeal to the Secretary of the Navy. He was fortunate
that the Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Chester Nimitz,
a submariner. Rickover prepared a letter for Admiral Nimitz
to endorse and who, upon indorsal, would forward it to the
Secretary of the Navy who, hopefully, would then approve the
Navy's seeking to build an atomic submarine. It took Rickover
more than two months to get the letter moved along the chain
of command until it reached Nimitz. This painfully slow pro-
cedure shows that Rickover knew when to step out of the normal
operating channels and when to remain within them. Finally,
because of the support of Admiral Mills and a few other far-
sighted officers, the letter reached Nimitz who quickly gave
the project his support. With Nimitz' s endorsement it seemed
that the project was being pushed by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and many people in the Navy who had been only vaguely
59interested in the idea began to take more notice of it. J
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Rickover' s letter, with Nimitz's approval was for-
warded to the Secretary of the Navy who, to Rickover' s sur-
prise and pleasure, quickly gave the project his backing. Now
Rickover had the official sanction of his superiors in the
Navy. His next step was to get the support of the Atomic
Energy Commission which was needed as all matters relating to
atomic energy were under its control and required its approval.
AEC approval might also mean some financial support for the
project which would help speed work and prevent possible intra-
service friction resulting from competition for funds with
other projects. In his attempt to get AEC support Rickover
had the full support of the Bureau of Ships. He drafted a
letter which Admiral Mills signed and forwarded to the AEC.
It stated that no time should be lost in proceeding with the
building of a nuclear powerplant for a submarine. The letter
stressed that the achievement of this goal was vital for the
Navy to be able to carry out its mission. It further stated
that:
The problems to be solved are so intimately connected
with both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Navy
that neither activity can make separate engineering
decisions regarding them, and the program must be co-
ordinated in the closest manner between the Navy and
the Atomic Energy Commission. 60
This letter, dated January 20, 1948, did not move the
Atomic Energy Commission in support of a nuclear submarine.
The AEC was still, at this time, mainly interested in the
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atomic bomb. However, a second chance soon presented itself.
On April 2, 194S. the Bureau of Ships was invited to
send a speaker to the Undersea Warfare Symposium. Rickover
wanted to use this as a chance to stress the Navy's desire to
build an atomic submarine and to charge the Atomic Energy
Commission with handicapping its efforts by not lending its
support to the project. He got Admiral Mills to present a
speech which he had written. The speech would have more of
an impact coming from the head of the Bureau of Ships. Mills
said that:
. . . less than one per cent of the work which will
ultimately be required to design a submarine plant has
now been accomplished. . . .There is another point which
1 feel 1 must make clear to this audience, and that is
that to date the Atomic Energy Commission has never
recognized the atomic submarine power pile as a project,
nor has it given official status or priority to such a
pile. 1 mention this because the impression is abroad
that considerable work is being done on a submarine pile
and that this project enjoys a high priority. •»
Though this was an open attack upon the Atomic Knergy
Commission, it was not directed against any individuals or to
anyone within the services which is an important difference
from the attacks Mitchell made in trying to further his cause.
Mills' attack was not followed by any favorable
developments on the part of the AEC and Rickover decided it
was time to force the latter' s hand. He wrote the Atomic
Energy Commission that the Navy vitally needed the atomic sub-
marine and that it would proceed on its own to develop it if
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no help was to come from them. Rickover had carefully built
a solid backing for himself before doing this. It was a bold
move, but not an irrational one. With the head of the Bureau
of Ships, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of
the Navy all stating the atomic submarine was vital to the
Navy, Rickover could easily summon support for a charge that
the AEC was hindering the progress of national defense by
stopping him or by refusing to sanction and support the Navy
project.
Finally, by May, 19*8, the AEC agreed formally to
undertake a Navy reactor program and it moved the small group
from the Monsanto project, which it realized was unofficially
working on a naval reactor, to its new laboratories at Argonne.
This completed Rickover' s first phase in bringing about an
atomic submarine. He had obtained the support of his superiors
in the service and the government. Now, in order to complete
the project as soon as possible, his task became one of assur-
ing that the program would not bog down as the Monsanto and
General Electric projects had done. General Electric, it is
to be remembered, was still putting most of its efforts into
research on a breeder reactor rather than a naval reactor.
Rickover' s most useful tool in bringing the project to a
successful conclusion was to be his administrative genius of
being able to cut corners. His low point had come in June of
1947, when his group at Oak Ridge was disbanded. By May, 19*8,
eleven months later, he had cleared most of the administrative
problems in the path of building the atomic submarine.
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Rickover now began a successful effort to broaden
industrial interest and support for the atomic reactor project.
This was to serve a dual function. First, with business in-
volved, more money would be available for research in a
reactor. Also, he was undoubtedly aware of the positive bene-
fits that would accrue to the program if the powerful indus-
trial lobby were enlisted on the side of atomic reactor devel-
opment. He began to prod Westinghouse into taking an active
interest in atomic energy. He did this through personal
acquaintances with many Westinghouse officials whom he knew
through his earlier position as head of the Electrical Section
of the Bureau of Ships, and also by giving them small con-
tracts to gradually build up an interest and experience on
62
their part in the atomic field. He finally managed to
interest Westinghouse enough to get it to accept a contract
from the Navy, which he arranged, for research on a heat-
exchange system for an atomic reactor. With Westinghouse
joining General Electric in the atomic field, Rickover had
enlisted, indirectly, two of the most capable, wealthy, and
respected electrical giants in his work for an atomic reactor
and an atomic submarine.
These successes only drove Rickover to push his
project faster. He realized that bureaucratic "red-tape,"
engineering problems, and the lag between the conception of
a component for the reactor and the submarine and the
62
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production of that component by industry were the only limits
on the time it would take to develop an operational nuclear
powered submarine. In his characteristic fashion, he immedi-
ately set out to deal with all these problems. He threw away
the Navy's traditional ways of working. His goal was the
only guide for his actions. This alienated a lot of persons
who fully agreed with the worth of his project but who did
not approve, and in many cases resented, the way he went about
pushing his project. The full reaction against his unorthodox
methods and his bulldozing tactics came to the surface in the
early 1950' s and contributed to a move which nearly ended his
career in the Navy at a time when the atomic submarine was
near completion.
fiickover had clearly established himself as the man
in charge of atomic propulsion for the Navy and he took over
Captain Mumma's job as head of the Nuclear Power Division of
the Bureau of Ships. His first act in this position was to
reassemble the members of the original Navy team at Oak Ridge
which had been disbanded the year before on Mumma's orders.
After doing that, Rickover managed one of the cleverest "anti-
bureaucracy" moves of his career. He decided that he should
have a position in the AEC chain of command as head of its
newly established Naval Reactor Branch which was made a part
of the Division of Reactor Development. With the support of
Admiral Mills once more, Rickover got the appointment. He
now held a command in the AEC and in the Navy. Had this not
been done there would have been a civilian to whom Rickover
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would have been responsible. This would not only have been
inimical to him, but it would also have placed an extra man
in the command structure which might have lowered the effi-
ciency of operation as well as causing friction in the
leadership. '
The establishment by the AEC of a Division of Reactor
Development in September, 19^8, was the signal private indus-
tries had been waiting for and they realized that atomic power
for peaceful uses would not be far in the future and they
began to take a more active interest. Westinghouse, already
in the field because of the small contract set up by Eickover
for a heat-exchange system, wanted to expand its efforts to
work on a complete reactor. Rickover was overjoyed. To do
this however, Westinghouse needed fissionable material which
was still tightly controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission.
Rickover would not let this chance slip by to bring Westing-
house fully into the atomic reactor program. He not only got
the AEC to let Westinghouse have fissionable material, he also
got it to allocate money for Westinghouse to build an atomic
laboratory which they then would staff with their own scien-
tists and engineers. Thus, Rickover got the benefit of having
many of Westinghouse' s top men work on the project which was
definitely specified as being a submarine reactor.
The Navy, of course, was fully behind the project by
this time. When it was discovered that no money had been
65Wallace, "A Deluge of Honors," Life . 110.
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directly appropriated for the Navy's share of the atomic sub-
marine project for 194-9, 83,000,000 was quickly diverted from
64
a general fund to the submarine project.
Rickover had an almost free hand in his work to
develop the atomic submarine from this time on. The Navy and
the Atomic Energy Commission wanted to see the project com-
pleted as soon as possible. The Navy of course wanted to get
a nuclear powered ship which would not only revolutionize
ship propulsion, but also provide it with a "true" submarine
which would dramatically indicate to everyone that the Navy
had joined the atomic age, a very useful propaganda device in
view of its conflict at that time with the Air Force. The
Atomic Energy Commission wanted to show that atomic energy
could also be used for peaceful and practical purposes.
In order to prevent any time lag between the comple-
tion of the reactor, which Rickover judged would take five
years from 1949» and the completion of a submarine to house
the reactor, he got the Bureau of Ships to start designing an
"atomic" submarine. He wanted to enlist the Portsmouth Navy
Yard to build the atomic submarine. But, when it declined on
the grounds that it did not have a large enough staff to
undertake the project, Rickover got the Electric Boat Company
of Groton, Connecticut, the only other experienced submarine
builder in the United States, to enter the project. 6^
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The remaining story of the development of the first
atomic powered ship, the submarine Nautilus , is largely one
of overcoming technical and scientific problems as well as
being a further example of Rickover, the administrator par
excellence, at work. Of more interest to this paper is the
treatment of Hickover by the Navy when Nautilus was on the
verge of completion.
A selection board to promote Navy officers from
Captain to Rear Admiral met in July of 1951 • Rlckover's name
was on the list because he was a senior Captain. He was not
promoted at this time. Navy rules state that an officer
twice passed over for promotion will automatically be retired
from the service. When a selection board was ready to meet
again in late 1952 to consider senior Captains for flag-rank,
Secretary of the Navy, Dan Kimball made an obvious gesture on
Rickover' s behalf so he would not be forced into retirement.
The day before the nine senior Admirals were scheduled to con-
vene, he presented Rickover with a gold star to add to his
Legion of Merit. Before this, the chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission had sent a letter to the board in which he
stated that Rickover had been the man instrumental in the
atomic submarine project. Senator Brien McMahon of Connecti-
cut, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy, had also written a letter to the Chief of Naval
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Operations praising Kickover and the work he had done. ' To
almost everyone's surprise, when the promotions were announced
in January, 1953, Rickover had been passed over again.
According to Navy regulations he had to retire even though he
had just performed a most outstanding job for the Navy and the
country. It is impossible to determine exactly why Rickover
was passed over by the promotion board as its deliberations
were customarily confidential and no minutes of proceedings
were kept. But, Kickover' s unorthodox methods probably did
not endear him to the Admirals on the board. Also he was not
a line officer. He had no combat experience and had not served
in a combat theater during the war. The fact that he was
Jewish may also have detracted from his cause.
Nevertheless, it seems that as soon as Rickover was
passed over the Navy set out on a deliberate course to mini-
mize his role in the development of the atomic submarine.
Perhaps his failure to be promoted was just one aspect of this
larger policy. One cannot determine which came first, but it
is quite obvious that the Navy was openly attempting to make
it look as if the atomic submarine project was charted and
nursed along in its entirety by the Bureau of Ships. This
was made easier because Admiral Mills, one of Rickover 's
staunchest supporters, had left the Bureau of Ships and was
in retirement by this time. Articles appearing in the Bureau
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of Ships Journal on the atomic submarine failed to make any
reference to Hickover. The official line in the Navy clearly
was to discount Hickover 's development of the atomic submarine
and to credit the Navy instead. It is very probable that the
Navy wanted to use the development of the atomic submarine
and the first practical use of atomic power for propaganda
and public relations purposes. To do this, the role of the
individual, Rickover, would have to be played down, while
credit to the Navy as a whole would have to be emphasized.
The correlation desired was Navy-atomic submarine, not
Hickover-atomic submarine. As it seemed that Hickover would
now be retired, criticism against him became more frequent by
those who had been opposed to him all along because of his
non-conformity to Navy rules or because he had angered them
in the past. It was obvious that Rickover had little support
for himself within the Navy.
Rickover' s forced retirement however aroused immediate
opposition in Congress where he had built a strong following
on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, both of which were acquainted with the
atomic submarine project and Rickover' s decisive role in it.
Representative Sidney R. Yates of Illinois attacked the Navy's
promotion system and asked the Senate Armed Services Committee
to hold up action on confirmation of Navy promotions until it
could discover whether Rickover' s retirement placed the atomic
89
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submarine program in jeopardy. This the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee did. The Navy now publicly defended its
action by stating that an officer's entire career was con-
sidered for promotion to flag-rank not just one assignment or
achievement. Aware of the bad publicity the Navy was getting
and of the opposition to Rickover's forced retirement on the
part of two powerful Congressional Committees, the new Secre-
tary of the Navy of the Eisenhower administration, Robert B.
Anderson, stepped into the picture and announced that he had
arranged for Rickover to be kept on active duty for another
year while a special promotion board would meet in July to
reconsider Rickover's promotion.
°
This board recommended Rickover's promotion to Rear
Admiral. The very opposite of what the Navy wanted began to
happen. The press had become aware of Rickover's case and
it was now dramatized. Every story that came out emphasized
Rickover's decisive role in Nautilus ' development. Thus, in-
advertently, by attempting to hush-up Rickover's achievement,
the Navy actually helped him get all the public credit that
he deserved.
Rickover managed to stay in the Navy because of the
support he received in Congress and the Secretary of the Navy's
office both of which recognized his service to the country.
He remained an outsider though within the Navy even with his
CO
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high. rank. His unorthodox methods, his anathema to most
regulations, and his source of power and support independent
from the Navy made him even more suspect. He would be
tolerated but not rewarded. Probably any other man that
accomplished what Rickover did would have become Chief of
Naval Operations.
In 1958 Rickover faced a similar problem to that in
1952. He either had to get his third star or again face
retirement. Humors in Washington were that the Navy planned
to retire Rickover. When the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
questioned Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates about this,
he told them that the Navy had no Vice Admiral spot open for
Rickover. Once more Congress rallied to the side of Rickover
and put pressure on the administration and the Navy to pro-
mote Rickover. He then got his third star.
'
The Navy's mandatory retirement age for all officers
is 64. 71 January 27, 1964, Rickover' s 64th birthdate and re-
tirement date was fast approaching in late 1963 when the ques-
tion again arose as to his value to the Navy and the country's
atomic projects. It was decided that he was still needed.
On December 17, 1963, President Johnson nominated Rickover for
retirement at the permanent rank of Vice Admiral. His per-
manent rank at that time was Rear Admiral. At the same time,
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Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze announced that Hickover
would be recalled to active duty after he had gone through
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the motion of retiring on February 1, 1964-.' So, through a
technicality in the retirement laws Rickover has been retained
on active duty, year by year since 1964, at the pleasure of
nx
the Secretary of the Navy. *
At present, Rickover commands the Naval Ships Systems
, and is still chief c
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Command, of the Naval Reactors Branch of
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,
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'^"Let's Solve the Rickover Problem," Saturday
Evening Post
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CCXXXVI, (March 16, 1963), 80.
^Army Times
. June 21, 1967, 26.
CHAPTER IV
WHX MITCHELL FAILED AND RICKOVER SUCCEEDED
In analyzing the causes of success of any particular
person or project and the reasons for the failure of one of a
similar nature, it is always easier to establish the reasons
for triumph. Success seems to prove that the methods employed
were the right ones to achieve the desired end. On the other
hand, the reasons for failure are often difficult to determine
and many and perhaps various theories, all valid, may be used
to explain why a particular project failed.
In comparing Mitchell and Rickover one has primarily
to be aware of the differences in the Service in which each
operated and at the same time the different eras in which
each worked toward change.
The Army in the 1920' s was small and in the first
half of that decade declining appropriations were forcing it
to become even smaller. While the Army was fighting with
Congress and the Administration for more money Mitchell was
trying to get the Army to divert more of its limited funds
into the Air Service. This could only come at the expense
of the older and more established branches whose officers
were in command of the Army. Thus, Mitchell almost auto-
matically, by demanding more money for his service, was
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setting himself against the chiefs of his Service. The Navy
in the decade after World War 11 had much more money than was
available to the Army in Mitchell's time, and it was also in
the hands of leaders who were generally favorable to innova-
tion and recognized the need for progress and development in
all fields, particularly in the new atomic field. Thus the
Navy was much more receptive to new ideas and new projects.
Mitchell had to convince people that his ideas were right
before he could get anything done toward implementing them.
Hickover never really had to do this. The Navy was quite
willing and agreeable to the idea of atomic propulsion. Sick-
over just had to convince it that this should be done as
quickly as possible. Mitchell was attempting to establish a
relatively new weapon while Hickover was only bettering some-
thing the Navy already had and knew worked. Thus while
Mitchell never could get over the first step of convincing
his superiors of the value of the airplane, Hickover was more
fortunate in not having to do this for the submarine.
Mitchell also faced another problem that Rickover was
fortunate enough not to encounter. The theories of airpower
that Mitchell proposed and the basis for giving the airplane
such an important position in the defense structure as he
wanted, was based on the airplanes of the future. Technology
never caught up with Mitchell's ideas which made them much
harder to accept than if the airplane he was talking about
had been operational. To many who were not as farsighted as
he was, he seemed little more than a visionary dreamer of the
9*
Buck Soger's variety. After 194-5 however, atomic power was a
fact. The only thing that had to be done was to harness this
power and energy to some useful purposes other than bombs,
which few doubted could be done.
Mitchell had to arouse a public which was apathetic
on issues of national defense. He had to convince not only
the public, but Congress and the President of the value of the
airplane and then that this value could be best exploited in a
separate organization for aeronautics. This done, he would
have had to get more money out of a very frugal administration.
The public in the late 1940's was very much aware and concerned
about the problems of national defense and Congress was willing
to spend more money to insure that the United States would be
ready and protected in case war did come. There was a rather
potent pacifist opposition to any increases whatsoever in
either the military establishment or spending in the "twenties"
which Mitchell had to face.
KitcheH' s campaign of continuously stressing the air-
plane as the cure-all for the American defense problem
threatened to put many of his military colleagues out of a
job. Not only did he thus create opposition to himself and
his ideas within the Army, he also enlisted the Navy on the
side opposing him. His strategic doctrine made the air force
and the airplane the first line of defense against an enemy,
a place traditionally reserved for the battleship and the Navy.
His constant stressing that naval aviation should be combined
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with military aviation in a separate defense establishment
alienated many Navy fliers who wanted to help push the general
cause of aviation as Mitchell did, but would not support him
because their loyalty was to the Navy and they wanted to re-
main a part of the Navy.
Rickover and the atomic-submarine, along with atomic
propulsion, carried with them no new strategic concepts that
would reduce the importance or threaten the existence of other
military organizations and men. In fact, it did the exact
opposite. The Navy, being questioned as to what role ships
would play in the atomic and missile age was presented with
an answer by Rickover. It would have faster moving ships that
could be wider dispersed because atomic propulsion would mini-
mize the refueling problem. And, if surface ships were driven
off the seas entirely it could still function beneath the seas
in submarines that could stay submerged for months and posi-
tion themselves off the shores of a potential aggressor ready
to deliver an atomic retaliatory blow without ever surfacing.
The methods Mitchell used in carrying on his campaign
lacked both tact and taste and in the end had just the opposite
effect of what he wanted to achieve. Instead of gaining him
supporters for his concepts, they alienated many persons from
him both within and outside the service. Mitchell evidently
did not believe in "honest" disagreements, and when anyone
disagreed with him he openly attacked their motives and char-
acter. In challenging the honesty and integrity of his
superiors he invited and eventually received their censure
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and on further verbal attacks left them no alternative hut to
dismiss him from the service. He removed his argument from
the level of what defense structure was best for the nation
to one of disrespect and disobedience of a subordinate. The
question evolved into a disciplinary matter. An officer in
the Army could not get by accusing his superiors of "criminal
negligence" without damaging Army discipline forever. This
had to be met with a quick and decisive response. If his
court-martial was a calculated move on his part to rally
public support behind him, Mitchell misinterpreted public
opinion entirely. He was regarded as an energetic and a very
capable officer, but this certainly did not exalt him above
the General Staff of the Army and the General Board of the
Navy which were unanimously lined up against him. Also, the
air controversy had been in the news so much in the twenties
with Mitchell at its head that a saturation point seems to
have been reached by the time of Mitchell's court-martial.
People were not interested in the air issue any more. They
were only interested in the case because of its spectacular
nature. Mitchell's unprovable accusations had also tagged
him as a radical which in turn took away some of the validity
and reliability of his testimony on aeronautics. In general,
Mitchell was a militant reformer and he suffered from the
characteristics of all militant reformers. He quickly became
exasperated with those who disagreed with him because he was
so certain of his case, he could see no compromise, and his
sense of urgency and constant attacks and criticism built a
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strong opposition to him, not only because of his ideas hut
also because of his methods.
Sickover lined up his superiors in support of his
innovation and then got the support of the Atomic Energy
Commission. He even got industry involved in the project,
something Mitchell could not do because there was no big
industrial concern involved in aeronautics in the 1920's.
In fact, big industry may have been actively lobbying against
Mitchell. Much less steel and equipment of all kinds was
required to build airplanes as opposed to ships.
As has been indicated several times, Rickover's inno-
vation, atomic propulsion and the atomic submarine, was never
really opposed by the Navy. He was opposed because of his
unorthodox methods, his refusal to work by the rules, because
the Navy desired to get more credit for building the atomic
submarine, and for a host of smaller and harder to establish
reasons. But, Rickover had quite inadvertently, built a solid
base of support for himself in Congress. At the same time
he had not built any opposition to himself in Congress as
Mitchell had done through his general attacks on the Army,
the Navy, and the administration. Mitchell appealed to
Congress to help him whereas Rickover' s case came into Congress
on the initiative of some Congressional members themselves.
Had Congress decided to act in favor of Mitchell there is
little they could have done to hurt the Army. Appropriations
were already so low that any further reduction would have
been improbable as that would endanger the very existence of
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the Army. In the "fifties" there was quite a lot of money for
the defense establishment. The Navy was in heated competition
with the other services for this money 30 they courted the
favor of Congress. The Navy also did not want to incur the
wrath of Congress because this might have an adverse effect
on its case in the service unification controversy. After
Congress showed that it was supporting Rickover it did not
take long for the Navy to announce his promotion.
While Mitchell never had the pleasure of being honored
for his ideas in his lifetime as Rickover has been, he has
nevertheless been honored to some extent since his death, as
a "prophet" of air power. He has also been reinstated to the
Army and promoted posthumously to Major General although the
original court-martial conviction has not been changed despite
the efforts of his family. Congress has also voted him a
special Medal for Honor. It remains to be seen whether Rick-
over will be promoted to Chief of Naval Operations posthumously.
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This thesis deals with the general problem of innova-
tion in the military services and does this by comparing
General William "Billy" Mitchell and Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.
Mitchell wanted to make the airplane one of the primary
weapons of the Army and of the entire American defense estab-
lishment; he failed. Rickover had more limited objectives.
He wanted to bring atomic propulsion into the Navy by build-
ing a nuclear powered submarine; he succeeded.
The two men worked in different services and at dif-
ferent times. Mitchell worked to establish the airplane in a
very small Army which had limited funds in the early 1920' s.
His views on the importance of the airplane were not shared
by his superiors in the Army or in the Government. Therefore,
Mitchell turned to the public for help. He began a publicity
campaign whose purpose it was to emphasize the airplane as a
cheap defensive weapon to an isolationist public and a frugal
Congress. With public and Congressional support for the air-
plane he hoped the administration would force the Army to
adopt an expanded aeronautics policy. The logical development
of such a policy, in Mitchell's view, was the control of all
aircraft in a new service, an Air Force, which he would then
head.
Mitchell's scheme failed. He could not arouse a
public which was indifferent and apathetic to any subject
involving the armed forces establishment. He gradually be-
came more irritated and more militant as he made little head-
way in gaining acceptance of his views. In a last desperate
2gamble to enlist public opinion in his support he launched a
verbal attack against his superiors which brought about his
court-martial. He was found guilty of conduct detrimental to
the good order and discipline of the Army and suspended from
rank and pay for five years. This left him no choice but to
retire from the service.
Rickover's work in developing the atomic submarine
came at a time when the Navy was receptive to new ideas. The
development of atomic weapons during World War II had intro-
duced a new element into warfare which necessitated a reinter-
pretation of traditional roles and strategic and tactical con-
cepts on the part of all of the services in view of this new
factor. The newly independent Air Force claimed the pre-
dominant role in the defense establishment with a concept of
strategic nuclear bombing. The future usefulness of the Navy
was questioned. Thus Rickover had the support of his superiors
in working toward atomic propulsion which would dramatically
usher the Navy into the atomic age.
His difficulties were mainly in overcoming administra-
tive bottlenecks and scientific problems. But, while the Navy
was receptive to innovations in the years following the war,
it remained traditional in its biases and methods of working.
Rickover did not correspond to the normal design of a Naval
officer. He shunned social activities, he disagreed with
tradition as a guide for action, he was an engineering spe-
cialist, and he was Jewish. Furthermore, his unorthodox
methods in pushing the Nautilus program to a rapid conclusion
3were resented by many other officers, '.Jhen the time came for
him to be promoted or retired, the Navy chose to retire him.
Rickover however had built a base of support in Congress by
this time, which was independent of the Navy. His competency
had been recognized by both the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.
These powerful committees combined to pressure the administra-
tion and the Navy to promote Rickover and keep him in the Navy.
Innovators in the military, by the very fact that they
are attempting to establish new ideas, are outside the main-
stream of their service which relies heavily on tradition as
a guide for action. A major innovation will often invalidate
many traditional concepts and doctrines upon which a service
has been trained and upon which the chiefs of the service
have based their plans. Unless there is absolute certainty
of a necessity for change, as in the case of a major techno-
logical breakthrough, the change will usually be resisted.
Thus, while individualism and personal initiative have their
merits in the military, they are not favorably looked upon
when related to breaking with tradition and established
doctrine.
